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ABSTRACT 
When President Obama took office in 2009, Congress through 
appropriations linked the U.S. Department of Homeland Security’s 
(DHS) funding to “maintaining” 33,400 immigration detention beds a 
day. This provision, what this Article refers to as the bed quota, remains 
in effect, except now the mandate is 34,000 beds a day. Since 2009, DHS 
detentions of non-citizens have gone up by nearly 25 percent. To 
accommodate for this significant spike over a relatively short period of 
time, the federal government has relied considerably on private prison 
corporations to build and operate immigration detention facilities. 
This Article takes a comprehensive look at the Congressional 
immigration detention bed quota. It details its legislative history, and the 
relationship between the quota and private prisons in the immigration 
detention system. It situates the provision in a conversation about quotas 
generally, both in the law enforcement context and also in relation to the 
significance of quotas in U.S. immigration law historically. The Article 
then examines the bed quota through the lens of foundational as well as 
present-day jurisprudence on immigration detention and the Due 
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. It also 
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analyzes the quota through international human rights law, particularly 
the protections related to arbitrary detention and vulnerable migrants. 
The Article concludes with policy considerations that caution against 
Congress imposing the immigration detention bed quota. 
INTRODUCTION 
Thirty years of failed federal immigration law reform efforts have 
changed the way U.S. immigration policies are made. Rather than doing 
nothing about the approximately eleven million undocumented 
immigrants living in the country,1 entities beyond the federal legislative 
branch have gotten involved in the regulation and enforcement of 
immigration. In fact, “the great bulk of contemporary immigration 
policymaking stems not from Congress, but rather from executive 
branch agencies and states.”2 
This modern version of American immigration policymaking raises 
novel questions as to which governing bodies can, or from a public 
policy perspective should, regulate and enforce immigration laws. One 
set of inquiries involves states legislating immigration control 
measures,3 a type of contemporary immigration policymaking.4 The 
 
 1.  Jens Manuel Krogstad et al., 5 Facts About Illegal Immigration in the U.S., PEW 
RESEARCH CENTER (Sept. 20, 2016), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2015/07/24/5-facts-
about-illegal-immigration-in-the-u-s/.  
 2.  Catherine Y. Kim, Immigration Separation of Powers and the President’s Power to 
Preempt, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 691, 692 (2014).  
 3.  See Carrie L. Rosenbaum, The Role of Equality Principles in Preemption Analysis of 
Sub-Federal Immigration Laws: The California TRUST Act, 18 CHAP. L. REV. 481 (2015) 
(describing the trend of state laws seeking to regulate immigration as “sub-federal immigration 
laws”), Hidetaka Hirota, The Moment of Transition: State Officials, the Federal Government, and 
the Formation of American Immigration Policy, 99 J. AM. HIST. 1092 (2013) (stating that prior to 
the late 1800s, before the creation of federal immigration law, immigration regulation and 
enforcement was a matter of state law, but for a brief period in in the late 18th century), Gerald 
L. Neuman, The Lost Century of American Immigration Law (1776-1875), 93 COLUM. L. REV. 
1833, 1881 (1993) (“[T]he federal government briefly entered the alien regulation business in 
1798.”); see also Ingrid V. Eagly, Local Immigration Prosecution: A Study of Arizona Before SB 
1070, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1749 (2011) (describing how Arizona, despite formal prohibition on state 
and local immigration regulation, prosecutes immigration-related crimes, and arguing how 
through local prosecutors, the state is nonetheless restructuring the federal system for punishing 
immigration crime). 
 4.  See Ian Gordon & Tasmeen Raja, 164 Anti-Immigration Laws Passed Since 2010? A 
Mojo Analysis, MOTHER JONES (Mar. 2012) (showing that the height of state anti-immigration 
laws was 2010-2011, when 164 such laws were passed), http://www.motherjones.com/politics/ 
2012/03/anti-immigration-law-database; see also Rick Su, The States of Immigration, 54 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 1339 (2013) (arguing that state immigration laws are enacted less for their impact 
and more for shaping federal immigration policy making); Michael J. Wishnie, Laboratories of 
Bigotry? Devolution of the Immigration Power, Equal Protection, and Federalism, 76 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 493 (2001) (arguing that the devolution of immigration authority to states by Congress 
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most prominent example is Arizona’s Support Our Law Enforcement 
and Safe Neighborhoods Act, commonly referred to as S.B. 1070. The 
U.S. Supreme Court in 2012 struck down three of the statute’s four 
provisions challenged by the Obama Administration.5 The Court 
withheld judgment on the constitutionality of S.B. 1070’s “show your 
papers” or “papers please” provision,6 which requires police officers to 
determine the immigration status of any person they lawfully stop, 
detain, or arrest if “reasonable suspicion exists that the person is an 
alien and is unlawfully present in the United States.”7 Since the Arizona 
v. United States decision, restrictive immigration state laws have been 
on the downturn.8 
The other recent manifestation of contemporary immigration 
policy making is executive orders, namely Deferred Action for 
Childhood Arrivals (DACA) announced by President Obama in June 
2012, and expanded DACA and Deferred Action for Parents of 
Americans and Lawful Permanent Residents (DAPA) announced in 
November 2014.9 The second executive actions were enjoined by the 
 
contradicts the notion of sovereignty and thus should not receive the deference granted 
traditionally to federal immigration law).  
 5.  Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. _ (2012). For a summary of the decision, see David 
Martin, Reading Arizona, 98 VA. L. REV. IN BRIEF 41 (2012).  
 6.  Adam Liptak, Blocking Parts of Arizona Law, Justices Allow Its Centerpiece, N.Y. 
TIMES (June 25, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/26/us/supreme-court-rejects-part-of-
arizona-immigration-law.html?_r=0; see also Hardy Haberman, ‘Your Papers Please!’, DALLAS 
VOICE (May 6, 2010, 2:39 PM), http://www.dallasvoice.com/your-papers-please-1020702.html 
(linking Arizona’s law with the phrase “your papers please” used in Nazi Germany). 
 7.  ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 11-1051(B) (2012). In 2013, the Arizona Civil Rights Advisory 
Board heard from undocumented immigrants testifying on the negative impact the “show me your 
papers” provision has had on the community. Valeria Fernández, Three Years After Passing Its 
“Papers, Please” Law, Arizona Is Divided by Distrust and Fear, ALTERNET (Mar. 29, 2013), 
http://www.alternet.org/civil-liberties/three-years-after-passing-its-papers-please-law-arizona-
divided-distrust-and-fear. In 2014, the Obama Administration agreed to drop their challenge of 
this provision. Howard Fischer, Brewer, Feds Cut Deal on SB1070’s “Papers Please” Provision, 
ARIZ. CAPITOL TIMES (June 10, 2014, 7:56 AM), http://azcapitoltimes.com/news/2014/06/10/ az-
sb1070-jan-brewer-deal-on-papers-please-provision/.  
 8.  Catalina Restrepo, Annual Review of State-Level Immigration Policy Still Trending Pro-
Immigrant, AMERICAN IMMIGRATION COUNCIL IMMIGRATION IMPACT (Aug. 11, 2015), 
http://immigrationimpact.com/2015/08/11/state-immigration-laws-2015/. For additional analysis 
of the Arizona v. United States decision, see, e.g., Lucas Guttentag, Immigration Preemption and 
the Limits of State Power: Reflections on Arizona v. United States, 9 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 1 (2013); 
Adam B. Cox, Enforcement Redundancy and the Future of Immigration Law, 2013 SUP. CT. REV. 
31 (2012) (arguing that the Supreme Court’s decision made the case as much about separation of 
powers than about federalism). For a perspective arguing that SB 1070 was a constitutional state 
legislative act, see Calvin L. Lewis et al., Why Arizona Senate Bill 1070 is Constitutional and Not 
Preempted by Federal Law, 89 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 283 (2012).  
 9.  Jennifer G. Parser & David L. Woodard, President Obama’s Executive Action on 
Immigration Policy, THE NAT’L L. REV. (Dec. 1, 2014), http://www.natlawreview.com/article/ 
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Southern District of Texas,10 on the grounds that the programs exceed 
the President’s immigration power.11 The Fifth Circuit affirmed the 
District Court’s decision.12 This case then went up to the Supreme 
Court,13 and in June of 2016, the Supreme Court in a 4-4 tie failed to 
provide guidance on the proper allocation of immigration powers 
between the Executive and Congress.14 
This Article circles back to a traditional site of immigration 
policymaking, namely Congress, to examine the extent to which the 
Legislature can prescribe the Executive branch’s enforcement of 
immigration law. Importantly, it does so taking into account the context 
of modern immigration policymaking. The federal legislative act that is 
the inquiry of this Article is the immigration detention bed quota 
Congress mandates through the U.S. Department of Homeland 
 
president-obama-s-executive-action-immigration-policy. While the trend of state anti-immigrant 
laws has reversed after the Supreme Court’s ruling in Arizona v. United States, those who 
supported both sides claimed the Supreme Court’s decision was a victory. See Kerry Abrams, 
Plenary Power Preemption, 99 VA. L. REV. 601, 602 (2013).  
 10.  The decision by the court to apply the injunction nation-wide is being challenged in 
Complaint, Batalla Vidal v. Baran et. al., No. 16-cv-04756 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 25, 2016). The Plaintiff 
in Batalla applied and was granted a three-year period of deferred action and employment 
authorization based on expanded DACA, Complaint at ¶ 32. However, in May 2015 Defendants 
revoked his three-year employment authorization after the issuance of the preliminary injunction 
in Texas v. United States, and issued him a two-year employment authorization, Complaint at ¶ 
38. The Plaintiff asks the court to declare that the preliminary injunction entered in Texas v. 
United States. does not apply to New York residents based on arguments including the Texas 
District Court’s lack of jurisdiction over residents of New York, see Complaint at ¶43, ¶44, and 
that the revocation of Plaintiff’s employment authorization document violated the Administrative 
Procedure Act (APA), see Complaint at ¶ 58. 
 11.  Kevin Johnson, Symposium: United States v. Texas - The Road to Perpetual Immigration 
Gridlock, SCOTUSBLOG (Feb. 11, 2016, 9:52 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2016/02/ 
symposium-united-states-v-texas-the-road-to-perpetual-immigration-gridlock/; Jennifer G. 
Parser, DAPA and DACA: What Happened to President Obama’s Executive Action?, THE NAT’L 
L. REV. (July 25, 2015), http://www.natlawreview.com/ article/dapa-and-daca-what-happened-to-
president-obama-s-executive-action.  
 12.  United States v. Texas, 787 F.3d 733 (5th Cir. 2015). 
 13.  United States v. Texas, 579 U.S. ___ (2016). The Department of Justice unsuccessfully 
petitioned the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals to lift the injunction. 
 14.  For different viewpoints on the constitutionality of the November 2014 executive 
actions, see, e.g., Peter Margulies, The Boundaries of Executive Discretion: Deferred Action, 
Unlawful Presence, and Immigration Law, 64 AM. U.L. REV. 1183 (2015) (arguing that DAPA 
exceeds the President’s authority); Josh Blackman, The Constitutionality of DAPA Part II: 
Faithfully Executing the Law, 19 TEX. REV. LAW & POL. 213 (2015) (analyzing DAPA through 
the Take Care Clause and arguing that DAPA falls within the President’s powers and duty to 
execute the laws of Congress); Robert J. Delahunty & John C. Yoo, Dream On: The Obama 
Administration’s Nonenforcement of Immigration Laws, the DREAM Act, and the Take Care 
Clause, 91 TEX. L. REV. 781 (2013) (addressing the original DACA program created by the 
Executive in 2012 and arguing “that the Constitution’s Take Care Clause imposes on the 
President a duty to enforce all constitutionally valid acts of Congress . . . . [and so] there is simply 
no general presidential nonenforcement power.”). 
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Security’s (DHS) appropriations process.15 The provision was first 
introduced when President Obama took office in 2009, and ties DHS’s 
funding to maintaining a minimum number of detention beds per day.16 
The quota, initially 33,400 beds, today sets the daily minimum number 
of immigration detention beds DHS shall maintain at 34,000.17 This 
Article explores the legality of the detention bed quota, namely 
whether the quota violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution, and international 
human rights law limitations on arbitrary detention. 
There are also policy considerations that this Article will explore 
with relation to the detention bed quota. First, law enforcement quotas 
generally contravene agency or individual officers’ discretion in a 
manner that is not in the best interest of society.18 A long-standing part 
of the immigration enforcement regime has been prosecutorial 
discretion, specifically that “[a] favorable exercise of prosecutorial 
discretion in immigration law identifies the agency’s authority to 
refrain from asserting the fully scope of the agency’s enforcement 
authority.”19 The Supreme Court’s deadlock in United States v. Texas 
leaves in place the lower court’s injunction of the Executive’s DAPA 
and expanded DACA programs.20 In doing so, it remains unresolved 
whether the President’s power of prosecutorial discretion in 
immigration law includes the authority to create such programs.21 While 
 
 15.  Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 114-4, 129 Stat. 39, 
43 (2015). See also Nick Miroff, Controversial Quota Drives Immigration Detention Boom, 
WASHINGTON POST (Oct. 13, 2013) (“We know ICE can fill more than 34,000 beds, so why would 
they use less?’ said [John] Culberson [R-TX], a member of the House Homeland Security 
appropriations subcommittee, which ties ICE funding to its compliance with the mandate.”), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/controversial-quota-drives-immigration-detention-
boom/2013/10/13/09bb689e-214c-11e3-ad1a-1a919f2ed890_story.html. 
 16.  Philip L. Torrey, Immigration Detention’s Unfounded Bed Mandate, in IMMIGRATION 
BRIEFINGS 5 (Apr. 2015).  
 17.  Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 114-4, 129 Stat. 39, 
43 (2015). 
 18.  The prosecutorial discretion power in the immigration context is distinct from that in 
the criminal context, the latter which has been criticized as perpetuating systemic racial 
disparities. See Angela J. Davis, In Search for Racial Justice: The Role of the Prosecutor, 16 N.Y.U. 
J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 821 (2013).  
 19.  SHOBA SIVAPRASAD WADHIA, BEYOND DEPORTATION: THE ROLE OF 
PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION IN IMMIGRATION CASES 7 (2015) (showing that the Executive has 
applied this discretion, historically and in recent times, to both individual and groups). 
 20.  Mark Joseph Stern, In a Tied Vote, the Supreme Court Blocks Obama’s Immigration 
Actions, SLATE (June 23, 2016, 11:11 AM), http://www.slate.com/blogs/the_slatest/2016/06/23/ 
united_states_v_texas_ties_obama_immigration_executive_actions_blocked.html. 
 21.  Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, Symposium: A Meditation on History, Law, and Loss, 
SCOTUSBLOG (June 23, 2016, 2:08 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2016/06/symposium-a-
meditation-on-history-law-and-loss/. 
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it is still an open question for some whether the President should be 
able to implement these deferred action programs, the judicial impasse 
in United States v. Texas does not implicate the Executive’s long-
standing discretion over immigration enforcement. As such, agency 
discretion over non-citizen removal and detention remains both an 
important component of modern immigration policymaking and, more 
specifically, a crucial consideration when examining the Congressional 
immigration bed quota. 
Second, quotas generally have demonstratively compelled action 
that runs counter to core democratic principles of non-discrimination 
and the deprivation of liberty interests as a last resort. For example, 
enforcement quotas have been linked to police officers using racial 
profiling.22 The immigration bed quota specifically delinks detention 
decisions from individualized determinations concerning public safety. 
As articulated by a former Immigrations and Customs Enforcement 
(ICE) director: 
Having a mandate out there that says you have to detain a certain 
number – regardless of how many folks are a public safety threat or 
threaten the integrity of the system – doesn’t seem to make a lot of 
sense. You need the numbers to drive the detention needs, not set 
an arbitrary number that then drives your operation.23 
The Congressional bed quota has resulted in unprecedented 
detention numbers.24 Since 2009, “the number of non-citizens DHS 
detains yearly has increased by nearly 25 percent.”25 And this practice 
 
 22.  See infra Part I.C.  
 23.  Banking on Detention: Local Lockup Quotas & the Immigrant Dragnet, DETENTION 
WATCH NETWORK & CENTER FOR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 2 (2015) [hereinafter DWN/CCR 
Report] (quoting former ICE Director John Sandweg in a September 2013 interview with 
Bloomberg). 
 24.  Some have in fact attributed the expansion of the immigration detention system to the 
Congressional bed quota. See, e.g., CÉSAR CUAUHTÉMOC GARCÍA HERNÁNDEZ, 
CRIMMIGRATION LAW 242 (2015) (“Aside from the many statutes that authorize or require 
detention . . . the size of today’s civil immigration detention estate can be attributed to a 
congressional directive known as the ‘bed mandate.’”). 
 25.  Mark Noferi, Immigration Detention: Behind the Record Numbers, CENTER FOR 
MIGRATION STUDIES (2014), http://cmsny.org/immigration-detention-behind-the-record-
numbers/. The average daily population increased almost five-fold between 1995 and 2011. See 
Doris Meissner et. al, Immigration Enforcement in the United States: The Rise of a Formidable 
Machinery, MIGRATION POLICY INSTITUTE 11 (the increase being from 7,475 to 33,330 detainees 
in ICE custody per day). According to the most recent DHS annual report available, in 2013 ICE 
detained 440,557 individuals. See John F. Simanski, Immigration Enforcement Actions: 2013, U.S. 
DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS 6 (Sept. 2014), 
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/ois_enforcement_ar_2013.pdf. The 2013 
figure was about 8% below the record-breaking number of detentions in Fiscal Year 2012, when 
477,000 individuals were in ICE custody. See DWN/CCR Report, supra note 23 at 1. The number 
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comes at a considerable price. Generally, with regard to immigration 
enforcement, “[t]he US government spends more on its immigration 
enforcement agencies than on all its other principal criminal federal 
law enforcement agencies combined.”26 The expenditure of these funds 
for detention largely lines the pockets of for-profit corporations, 
because more than half of immigration detention beds are operated by 
private prison corporations.27 The profits generated by these 
corporations’ immigration detention operations grew after Congress 
passed the bed quota.28 And the lobbying expenditures by these prison 
companies, including those spent on Congress members on the 
Appropriations Committee,29 has ensured that the spike in detention 
beds remains the status quo. 
One could argue that just because Congress requires that DHS 
“maintain” a specific number of beds does not mean that the Executive 
needs to fill them. This is not the view of certain legislators and DHS 
officials. One of the most recent examples is statements made by 
Representative John Culberson (R-TX), who said, “he expects the 
Obama Administration to find enough illegal immigrants to fill the 
detention beds Congress funds—or face budgetary consequences.”30 
Moreover, corporations with whom the agency contracts to operate 
over half of the detention system often get paid regardless of whether 
the beds are occupied.31 In any case, an interpretation of the statutory 
language of the bed quota as only requiring the agency to ensure 34,000 
beds are available per day (not filled) is still troubling from a policy 
perspective. 
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I presents the legislative 
history of Congress’s inclusion of the immigration bed quota in the 
 
of noncitizens detained in 2012 was more than double the number of individuals detained by ICE 
in 2001, see Stakeholder Submission to the United Nations Universal Periodic Review 22nd Session 
of the Working Group on the UPR Human Rights Council, THE ADVOCATES FOR HUMAN 
RIGHTS & DETENTION WATCH NETWORK 9 (Apr.-May 2015), http://www.theadvocatesfor 
humanrights.org/uploads/us_hrc_-_migrant_detention_-_sept_2014_2.pdf. 
 26.  Meissner et al., supra note 25, at 9 (emphasis in original). 
 27.  DWN/CCR Report, supra note 23, at 1. Sixty-two percent of immigration detention beds 
are operated by private prison corporations. Moreover, many government-owned immigration 
detention facilities use “privately contracted detention-related services such as food, security, and 
transportation.” Id. 
 28.  See infra Part II.B. 
 29.  See infra text accompanying notes 83–85. 
 30.  Sarah Chacko, Administration Warned to Keep Detention Beds Full, CQ ROLL CALL, 
2015 WL 1964623 (2015).  
 31.  Stephen H. Legomsky, The New Path of Immigration Law: Asymmetric Incorporation 
of Criminal Justice Norms, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 469 (2007). 
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DHS Appropriations bill, including opposition to the measure by both 
Congress members and civic society. It weaves in both private prison 
corporations and the role that quotas have played in law enforcement 
generally, and in particular U.S. immigration law. Part II begins with a 
Due Process analysis of the Congressional immigration detention bed 
quota under the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. It 
summarizes the historical and current jurisprudence of due process 
limitations on immigration detention and examines how the bed quota 
fares. Part II also applies international human rights law implicated by 
Congress’s imposition of a detention quota. Part III raises policy 
considerations relevant to both the relationship between Congress and 
the Executive branch on the issue of immigration enforcementand 
American society at large. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
The immigration enforcement scheme, including detention, is a 
civil, not criminal, system.32 This distinction, however, is virtually a legal 
fiction.33 Immigration detention facilities, even those holding women 
and children, look and operate like prisons.34 DHS contracts with 
prisons and jails, and so immigration and criminal detainees are also 
held together, side by side in the same facilities.35 
Since the creation of the modern federal immigration system in 
1965 with the enactment of the Immigration and Nationality Act 
 
 32.  See Subhash Kateel & Aarti Shahani, Families for Freedom Against Deportation and 
Delegalization, in KEEPING OUT THE OTHER: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION TO IMMIGRATION 
ENFORCEMENT TODAY 263 (David C. Brotherton & Philip Kretsedemas, ed., 2008) (“On the 
books, detention and deportation are civil—rather than criminal—processes run by the executive 
branch, not punishments given by the judiciary. For most detainees, it means that you are held 
like a prisoner without the niceties of the criminal justice system.”). 
 33.  Juliet P. Stumpf, Civil Detention and Other Oxymorons, 40 QUEENS L.J. 55 (2014).  
 34.  Raul A. Reyes, America’s Shameful “Prison Camps”, CNN (July 23, 2015), 
http://www.cnn.com/2015/07/23/opinions/reyes-immigration-detention/. 
 35.  See Abira Ashfaq, Invisible Removal, Endless Detention, Limited Relief: A Taste of 
Immigration Court Representation for Detained Noncitizens, in KEEPING OUT THE OTHER: A 
CRITICAL INTRODUCTION TO IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT TODAY 199 (David C. Brotherton 
& Philip Kretsedemas, ed., 2008) (describing immigrant detainees held in county jails: “You obey 
the rules of the jail. The jail guards treat you like any other prisoner. The administration gives 
you a number, a bed and a commode, and library hours just like any other prisoner. In fact, you 
are worse off because you cannot participate in the educational programs county inmates can 
participate in.”); see also Sarah Dávila-Ruhaak, ICE’s New Policy on Segregation and the 
Continuing Use of Solitary Confinement Within the Context of International Human Rights, 47 J. 
MARSHALL L. REV. 1433, 1439 (2014) (“The reality of immigration detention is, however, 
critically intertwined with the criminal penal system. Immigrant detainees are held in the same 
facilities as criminally convicted persons and subject to similar, if not the same, treatment.”). 
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(INA), detention was not a significant or even active component of 
immigration enforcement.36 Today, however, this history is barely 
believable, as the detention of non-citizens in the United States is 
currently the country’s largest  detention system.37 The most recent 
chapter of this story involves Congress’s immigration detention bed 
quota. 
The immigration detainee population, which was already on the 
steady rise, increased by twenty five percent after Congress included 
the quota in DHS’s appropriations in 2009.38 Former New York District 
Attorney Robert Morgenthau, amongst others,39 ascribes the 
unprecedented immigration detention numbers to the detention bed 
quota in DHS’ appropriations bill: 
On any given day, Immigration and Customs Enforcement keeps at 
least 34,000 immigrants locked up while they wait for their cases to 
be heard in immigration court. Many of these detainees are 
incarcerated not because they are dangerous or likely to skip their 
court dates, but because ICE must meet an arbitrary quota set by 
Congress.40 
Morgenthau points out that the immigration detention bed quota is 
starkly unique: “No other federal or state agency is required by law to 
detain a specific number of people without any regard to whether the 
quota makes sense from a law-enforcement perspective.”41 The 
detention of immigrants currently costs over 2 billion dollars per year, 
which provides a considerable financial incentive for both private 
prison companies and local governments looking to pull in revenue for 
struggling state, county, and municipal budgets.42 
This Part presents the legislative history of the bed quota, including 
considerable opposition to the measure. It then links the bed quota to 
the prevalence of private prison corporations in the immigration 
detention system, and concludes with an examination of quotas from 
 
 36.  Anita Sinha, Slavery by Another Name, “Voluntary” Detainee Labor and the Thirteenth 
Amendment, 11 STAN.J C.R.&C.L. 1, 8–9 (2015). 
 37.  David Alan Sklansky, Crime, Immigration, and Ad Hoc Instrumentalism, 15 NEW CRIM. 
L. REV. 157, 182 (2012). 
 38.  See Noferi, supra note 25.  
 39.  See GARCÍA HERNÁNDEZ, supra note 24. 
 40.  Robert M. Morgenthau, The US Keeps 34,000 Immigrants in Detention Each Day Simply 
to Meet a Quota, THE NATION (Aug. 13, 2014), http://www.thenation.com/article/us-keeps-34000-
immigrants-detention-each-day-simply-meet-quota/.  
 41.  Id. 
 42.  Detention Quotas, DETENTION WATCH NETWORK, https://www.detentionwatch
network.org/issues/detention-quotas.  
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the perspective of law enforcement generally, and within the historical 
context of immigration law specifically. 
A.  The Bed Quota’s Legislative History 
The immigration detention bed quota is a product of one line in 
DHS’s custody operations budget. That line, inserted by Congress for 
the first time43 in DHS’s Fiscal Year (FY) 2010 budget, reads: “Provided 
further, [t]hat funding made available under this heading shall maintain 
a level of not less than 33,400 detention beds through September 30, 
2010.”44 The number of beds increased to 34,000 in 2012,45 which is the 
number contained in the last DHS Appropriations bill passed in July of 
2015.46 
The legislative movement culminating in this bed quota began in 
the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks.47 In 2004, Congress passed 
the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA), which 
was the first mandate for a stated number of immigration detention 
beds.48 Although a precursor to today’s bed quota, IRTPA was different 
because it directed DHS to increase the “number of beds available for 
immigration detention.”49 The legislation also required that the 
expansion of immigration detention bed capacity be contingent on “the 
availability of appropriated funds.”50 
The immigration detention bed quota that operates today was 
introduced during President Obama’s first year in office by the late 
Democratic Senator Robert Byrd from West Virginia, then Chairman 
 
 43.  In some sources, the bed mandate is stated to appear first in 2007. See, e.g., Esther Yu 
Hsi Lee, Homeland Security Head Insists ‘Bed Mandate’ is Not a Quota to Fill Detention Centers, 
THINKPROGRESS (Mar. 12, 2014), http://thinkprogress.org/immigration/2014/03/12/3391911/jeh-
johnson-bed-mandate-quota/. The FY 2007 DHS budget did add new appropriations to increase 
the agency’s capacity to detain individuals, but it does not precisely relate to the quota that first 
appears in the FY 2009 DHS budget. See Torrey, supra note 16, at 4 (“The FY 2007 DHS budget 
increased the agency’s custody operations budget by $400 million, which was enough money for 
6,700 more beds and a total detention capacity of 27,5000 beds.”). 
 44.  Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-83, 123 
Stat. 2149 (2009). 
 45.  While Congress in 2011 failed to pass a DHS appropriations bill, it increased the 
immigration bed quota to 34,000 by passing the Continuing Appropriations Act of 2011. See 
Torrey supra note 16, at 6. 
 46.  Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 114-215, 129 Stat. 
39, 43 (2015). 
 47.  Torrey, supra note 16, at 3.  
 48.  Id. 
 49.  Id. 
 50.  Id. The Bush Administration consistently pushed for increased immigration detention 
bed capacity, ultimately increasing the total DHS detention capacity to 33,400. 
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of the Appropriations Subcommittee on Homeland Security.51 
Speaking on behalf of Senator Byrd,52 Illinois Democratic Senator 
Richard Durbin presented the five goals that Senator Byrd had for the 
new provision: 
No. 1, securing our borders and enforcing our immigration laws; No. 
2, protecting the American people from terrorist threats and other 
vulnerabilities; No. 3, preparing and responding to all hazards, 
including natural disasters; No. 4, supporting our State, local, tribal 
and private sector partners in homeland security with resources and 
information; and finally, giving the Department the management 
tools it needs to succeed.53 
These stated objectives, however, do not tell the whole story. 
Congress’s switch from legislating for increased immigration detention 
capacity to a detention quota was not happenstance—it came at a time 
when a new, Democratic President announced that he would be more 
focused on the country’s economic recession than immigration policy.54 
On the one hand, this meant that comprehensive immigration reform 
would be unlikely, but on the other hand, detaining non-citizens may 
provide for jobs.55 It also was a time, likely because of the recession, 
when the U.S. was experiencing “a multi-year decline in the 
undocumented immigration population.”56 From a fiscal policy 
perspective, it seems peculiar that Congress would mandate such high 
detention rates at taxpayers’ expense when unauthorized migration 
 
 51.  It should be noted that Senator Byrd had a significantly racialized political and 
legislative past, including with the Klu Klux Klan and voting against the 1965 Civil Rights Act. 
See Eric Pianin, A Senator’s Shame, WASH. POST (June 19, 2005), http://www.washington 
post.com/wpdyn/content/article/2005/06/18/AR2005061801105.html. 
 52.  Senator Byrd was seriously ill, which is why Senator Durbin spoke on his behalf, see 
Torrey, supra note 16, at 5. 
 53.  Christina Elhaddad, Note, Bed Time for the Bed Mandate: A Call for Administrative 
Immigration Reform, 67 ADMIN. L. REV. ACCORD 32, 34 (2014), (citing 155 CONG. REC. S7164 
(July 7, 2009) (statement of Sen. Richard Durbin)); William Selway & Margaret Newkirk, 
BLOOMBERG (Sept. 24, 2013, 12:01 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-09-
24/congress-fuels-private-jails-detaining-34-000-immigrants (quoting a former aide to Senator 
Byrd who stated that “[t]he senator wanted to ensure that cost increases wouldn’t lead ICE to 
fund fewer beds”). 
 54.  Torrey, supra note 16, at 4. 
 55.  See Ginger Thompson & David M. Herszenhorn, Obama Set for First Step on 
Immigration Reform, N.Y. TIMES (June 24, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/25/ 
us/politics/25immig.html (“The unemployment rate is expected to stay high, making Democrats 
who are wavering on immigration reform leery of supporting it.”). 
 56.  Bethany Carson & Eleana Diaz, Payoff: How Congress Ensures Private Prison Profit 
With an Immigrant Detention Quota, GRASSROOTS LEADERSHIP (Apr. 2015), http://grassroots 
leadership.org/reports/payoff-how-congress-ensures-private-prison-profit-immigrant-detention-
quota.  
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had fallen by more than fifty percent since the recession began.57 In 
fact, Representative David Price, the then-Chair of the House 
Committee on Appropriations Homeland Security Subcommittee, 
reportedly tried to prevent the quota’s inclusion, stating later that 
“[i]t’s not just pressure, . . . [i]t’s a requirement that [DHS] choose one 
course rather than the other, when the alternatives to detention would 
be less expensive and equally effective.”58 
1.  Opposition to the Bed Quota 
Advocacy groups have had a steadfast focus on eliminating the 
immigration detention bed quota. In particular, Grassroots Leadership, 
Detention Watch Network, and the Center for Constitutional Rights 
have presented how the quota is inextricably linked to private prison 
corporate interests.59 In 2014, over one hundred non-governmental 
organizations submitted a letter to Congress stating, inter alia, that 
ICE’s daily detention level should be determined only by actual need 
and that the quota is contrary to proven best practices in law 
enforcement.60 In 2013, a significant faction of Congress also raised 
their concerns. Sixty-five members of Congress signed a letter to the 
White House in opposition to the bed quota, characterizing the 
provision as compromising the agency’s “ability to satisfy its stated 
enforcement priorities and accomplish detention reform[,]” contrary to 
constitutionally protected due process protections, and a waste of 
taxpayer dollars.61 
In 2012 the House Committee on Appropriations issued a report 
on the FY 2013 proposed budget that recommended that Congress 
raise the detention bed quota from 33,400 to 34,000 beds. The House 
at this time was controlled by Republicans, and the “minority views” 
section of the report, i.e. by the Democratic members, voiced a different 
perspective. This section was entitled “Burdensome Immigration 
Provisions,” and stated that “the use of those beds should be 
determined by the enforcement actions and judgment of ICE on 
 
 57.  See Selway & Newkirk, supra note 53. 
 58.  Id.  
 59.  See, e.g., Grassroots Leadership supra note 56; DWN/CCR Report, supra note 23. 
 60.  Letter to Congress Members, Immigration detention bed mandate in FY 2015  
DHS Appropriations (Jan. 24, 2014), http://immigrantjustice.org/sites/immigrantjustice.org/files/ 
FINAL%20NGO%20sign-on%20bed%20mandate%20-%20Congress%201.24.14_1.pdf.  
 61.  Letter to President Obama from Members of Congress (Sept. 25, 2013), 
http://immigrantjustice.org/sites/immigrantjustice.org/files/2013_09_25%20Deutch%20Foster%
20Bed%20Mandate%20Letter%20to%20Obama.pdf. 
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whether detention is required for particular detainees.”62 It concludes 
by stating: “We are unaware of any other law enforcement agency with 
a statutory requirement to detain no less than a certain number of 
individuals on a daily basis.”63 
In 2013, two representatives introduced an amendment to the DHS 
Appropriations Act of 2014 that would have removed the bed quota. 
Representative Ted Deutch, one of the amendment’s co-sponsors, said 
this: “Arbitrary quotas that dictate how many people to keep in jail 
each day have no place in law enforcement . . . . The detention bed 
mandate forces immigration enforcement officials to focus on filling 
beds in expensive private detention facilities at the expense of 
taxpayers and hardworking, decent families.”64 The amendment failed 
232 to 190, with the votes largely casted along party lines.65 The 
following term, sixty members of Congress signed a letter urging for 
the end of the detention bed quota.66 
During this time, the Obama Administration stated the quota was 
about 2,000 more beds than it deems necessary, which critics of the 
quota pointed out “represent[s] an added cost of about $132 million a 
year.”67 Notably, in each of the five years since Congress included the 
quota into DHS’s annual appropriations, President Obama’s proposed 
budgets have never included the bed mandate language.68 In fact, in one 
year—in 2014 for FY 2015—the President’s budget request included a 
request to eliminate the quota, stating the number of beds maintained 
should be based on actual need.69 
Facing the threat of a government shut-down, ICE in 2013 released 
2,228 detainees to save costs.70 This action was immediately 
 
 62.  Torrey, supra note 16, at 6. 
 63.  Id. 
 64.  Foster, Deutch Efforts to end Immigrant Detention Bed Mandate, TIMES WEEKLY (Dec. 
16, 2014, 9:21 PM), http://thetimesweekly.com/news/2014/dec/16/foster-deutch-efforts-end-
immigrant-detention-bed-/.  
 65.  See Selway & Newkirk, supra note 53. 
 66.  Katharina Obser, The Outdated Immigrant Detention System, THE HILL (Oct. 18, 2013, 
6:00 PM), http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/judicial/329325-the-outdated-immigrant-
detention-system. 
 67.  Andy Sullivan, Insight: Congress Keeps Detention Quota Despite Immigration Debate, 
REUTERS (July 8, 2013, 5:32 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/07/08/us-usa-immigration-
detention-insight-idUSBRE96711920130708.  
 68.  President Obama’s FY 2013 and 2014 proposed budgets requested a reduction in 
detention capacity. See Torrey, supra note 16, at 6–7. 
 69.  Bessie Muñoz, Immigrants for Sale: Corporate America Puts a Price Tag on Sexual 
Abuse, 17 SCHOLAR 553, 563 (2015). 
 70.  César Cuauhtémoc García Hernández, Naturalizing Immigration Imprisonment, 103 
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reprimanded by the House of Representative’s then-Chair to the 
Homeland Security Committee as a “clear violation of statute,”71 a 
reference to the bed quota in DHS’s Appropriations bill. The agency 
was summoned to Congress to explain its actions. During this April 
2013 Congressional hearing, then-DHS Secretary Janet Napolitano 
called the quota “artificial” and stated that lowering the quota would 
allow the agency to provide alternatives to detention for low-risk, non-
U.S. citizens facing removal: “We ought to be detaining according to 
our priorities, according to public-safety threats, level of offense and 
the like, . . . not an arbitrary bed number.”72 
Two years later, however, a Congressional appropriations 
committee member suggested doubling down on the bed quota. During 
an April 2015 hearing on the Immigration and Customs Enforcement 
budget, Representative John Culberson (R-TX), after a heated back 
and forth with then-ICE director Sarah Saldana, suggested that the 
current language in the DHS appropriations bill should be amended to 
substitute the word “maintain” with “fill.”73 
Representative Culberson’s comment demonstrates how, despite 
the formidable opposition to the bed quota, proponents steadfastly 
support the provision as a key component of DHS’s appropriations. 
Private prison corporations, the main benefactors of the bed quota, are 
a significant part of the reason why. 
B.  The Detention Bed Quota and Prison Corporation Profits 
The private prison industry has a dominating presence in the U.S. 
immigration detention system, a fact inextricably related to the 
immigration detention bed quota. Corporate control over much of 
immigration detention is a phenomenon that emerged in the criminal 
justice context, amidst the political climate of the 1980s marked by the 
“War on Drugs.”74 With waning opportunities to maximize its profits in 
 
CAL. L. REV. 1449, 1500 (2015) (stating that even though “ICE conducted public safety and flight 
risk assessments and released only those presenting a low probability of both risks,” Republican 
congress members publicly accused the agency for releasing criminals and endangering 
Americans). 
 71.  See Selway & Newkirk, supra note 53. 
 72.  Id. (“In 2009, the year Congress set the bed quota, as many as 25 lobbyists represented 
[CCA] on budget and appropriations issues, according to filings with Congress.”). 
 73.  Budget Hearing on Immigration and Customs Enforcement Before the Subcomm. on 
Homeland Security of the H. Comm. on Appropriations, 114th Cong. (Apr. 15, 2015), 
http://appropriations.house.gov/calendar/eventsingle.aspx?EventID=394119. 
 74.  See Cody Mason, Dollars and Detainees: The Growth of For-Profit Detention, THE 
SENTENCING PROJECT 1 (July 19, 2012), http://www.sentencingproject.org/publications/dollars-
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the criminal justice setting, the 9/11 terror attacks opened the door for 
the private prison industry to see its next market share in the 
immigration detention business. This is because the policies that 
comprised the “War on Terror” involved heightened enforcement 
against non-citizens, including detention. It is important to note, 
however, that the majority of immigration detention beds were turned 
over to these for-profit entities for reasons other than their track 
record: 
For-profit prisons did not enter the immigrant detention business 
based on a track record of successfully providing detention services. 
The rise of this industry has been attributed to a combination of 
factors, including the trend toward privatization of government 
services, the ability of private contractors to create detention 
capacity more rapidly than government . . . , rising demand for 
detention and prison beds . . . , and the lack of accountability to 
DHS-ICE by state and local contractors.75 
The first privately owned immigration detention facility was 
opened in 1984 by Corrections Corporation of America (CCA),76 and 
the GEO Group (GEO) received its first immigrant detention contract 
in 1987.77 The era described as the “War on Immigrants”78 brought 
about by the legislative criminalization of immigrants created the 
opportunity for private companies to get into the business of 
incarcerating immigrants. Today, private companies operate sixty-two 
 
and-detainees-the-growth-of-for-profit-detention/ (“The War on Drugs and harsh sentencing 
laws led to explosive growth in state and federal prison populations in the 1980s. The massive rise 
in prisoners overwhelmed government budgets and resources, and created opportunities for 
private prison companies to flourish. In 2010, one in every 13 prisoners in the U.S. was held by 
for-profit companies.”). 
 75.  Unlocking Human Dignity: A Plan to Transform the U.S. Immigrant Detention System, 
U.S. CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS & CENTER FOR MIGRATION STUDIES 25–26 (2015), 
http://www.usccb.org/about/migration-and-refugee-services/upload/unlocking-human-
dignity.pdf. 
 76.  Philip L. Torrey, Rethinking Immigration’s Mandatory Detention Regime: Politics, 
Profit, and the Meaning of “Custody,” 48 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 879, 899 (2015). Recently, CCA 
announced a company name change to “CoreCivic,” “Corrections Corporation of America 
Rebrands as CoreCivic.” See Bethany Davis, Corrections Corporation of America Rebrands as 
CoreCivic, INSIDECCA, (Oct. 28, 2016, 11:00 AM), http://www.cca.com/insidecca/corrections-
corporation-of-America-rebrands-as-corecivic. However, this Article will refer to the company as 
CCA. 
 77. Unlocking Human Dignity: A Plan to Transform the U.S. Immigration Detention System, 
CENTER FOR MIGRATION STUDIES & U.S. CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS 25 (2015), 
http://www.usccb.org/about/migration-and-refugee-services/upload/unlocking-human-
dignity.pdf. 
 78.  See Cheryl Little, The War on Immigrants: Stories from the Front Lines, AMERICAS 
QUARTERLY (Summer 2008), http://www.americasquarterly.org/node/305 (“The U.S. 
Government’s War on Terror has transgressed into a War on Immigrants.”). 
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percent of the immigration detention beds79 and run nine out of ten of 
the largest immigration detention centers.80 
The bed quota has been linked to the fact that detention costs for 
undocumented immigrants have more than doubled since 2006, to the 
present figure of $2.8 billion annually.81 Detention costs have steadily 
increased despite the fact that the unauthorized entry at the U.S. border 
have dropped by two-thirds.82 Correspondingly, the private 
corporations’ profits have soared. CCA and GEO have expanded their 
share of the private immigrant detention industry from thirty seven to 
forty five percent in 2014, and have experienced dramatic profit 
increases: CCA’s profits increased from $133,373,000 in 2007, to 
$195,022,000 in 2014, and GEO’s profits increased 244 percent.83 
Morgenthau explains the illogical story told by these statistics by 
casting the bed quota alongside corporate interests: “The persistence 
of th[e] detainee quota is less surprising in light of the fact that for-
profit private prisons hold more than half of all immigration 
detainees.”84 
One explanation for the bed quota’s endurance is that it is linked 
to Congress members’ concerns about maintaining the flow of money 
and jobs into their states and districts.85 An explicit example is a 
question during the March 2013 House Judiciary Committee hearing 
posed by Pennsylvania Republican Representative Tom Marino, to 
then-ICE director Morton: “Why not take advantage—more 
advantage—of facilities like this [where it costs $82.50 per day per 
detainee], and particularly in Pike County [Pennsylvania], who built a 
whole new facility just to house these individuals?”86 
The other way in which profit-driven interests help make sense of 
the bed quota’s persistence relates to the private prison industry’s 
 
 79.  See Carson & Diaz, supra note 56.  
 80.  Id.  
 81.  See Sullivan, supra note 67. 
 82.  Id. 
 83.  Bethany Carson & Eleana Diaz, Payoff: How Congress Ensures Private Prison Profit 
with an Immigrant Detention Quota 4 (Apr. 2015), http://grassrootsleadership.org/sites/default/
files/reports/quota_report_final_digital.pdf.  
 84.  See Morgenthau, supra note 40. 
 85.  Id.; see also Hernández, supra note 70, at 1509 (pointing out that local governments also 
profit from immigration detention, noting that “immigration prisons are particularly attractive to 
local political leaders because the federal government pays almost all of the costs of detention.”).   
 86.  William Selway & Margaret Newkirk, Congress’s Illegal-Immigration Detention Quota 
Costs $2 Billion a Year, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 26, 2013, 8:16 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/new 
s/articles/2013-09-26/congresss-illegal-immigration-detention-quota-costs-2-billion-a-year. 
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spending.87 The two corporations that have come to operate most of the 
immigration detention beds companies have considerable lobbying 
expenditures: CCA has spent over $13 million on lobbyists since 2005, 
including lobbying staff for the Senate Appropriations Committee.88 
During this same period, GEO spent more than $2.8 million on 
lobbying efforts.89 
Professor Philip Torrey demonstratedthat for-profit prison 
companies’ lobbying and campaign contributions seemed to have paid 
off. One example is in 2005, when the industry spent about $5 million 
dollars, and then “[o]ver the next two years, ICE’s budget jumped from 
$3.5 billion to $4.7 billion.”90 By 2012, for-profit prison companies held 
federal contracts worth approximately $5.1 billion.91 Representative 
Adam Smith (D-Wash) definitively linked the detention bed quota to 
corporate profits, stating, “Frankly, I think if you eliminate the bed 
mandate, that’s the first step toward eliminating privatization, because 
that’s a huge thing that’s driving their profits.”92 
1.  Contractual Occupancy Rate Guarantees 
Occupancy guarantee clauses, also known as “lockup quotas,”93 are 
characteristic of for-profit prisons in the criminal prison context. Since 
2003,94 private prison corporations have promoted and operated 
prisons under contracts with state and local governments which involve 
occupancy guarantee clauses for the duration of the contract term.95 In 
2013, three private prison companies in Arizona had contracts with the 
 
 87.  See Hernández, supra note 70, at 1508 (“Collectively, from 2005 to early 2013, private 
prison companies spent approximately $45 million lobbying state and federal politicians, 
including key lawmakers who have advanced proposals that world have expanded civil and 
criminal immigration imprisonment.”).  
 88.  See Selway & Newkirk, supra note 53. 
 89.  Id. 
 90.  Torrey, supra note 76, at 904. 
 91.  Id. 
 92.  Roque Planas, Bed Quota Fuels ‘Inhumane’ and ‘Unnecessary’ Immigrant Detention: 
Report, THE HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 15, 2015, 6:04 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ 
2015/04/15/private-prison-immigrant-detention_n_7072902.html.  
 93.  Ghita Schwartz & Silky Shah, Ending Local Detention Quotas, Secret Perks for 
Corporations in Federal Contracts and Profiting Off Jailing Immigrant Families, THE HILL (June 
17, 2016, 2:12 PM), http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/judicial/283785-ending-local-detention-
quotas-secret-perks-for-corporations-in.  
 94. See DWN/CCR Report, supra note 23, at 3 (stating that guaranteed minimums “can be 
understood in the context of the private prison industry’s past instability and its successful pursuit 
of guaranteed profits.”). 
 95.  Criminal: How Lockup Quotas and “Low-Crime Taxes” Guarantee Profits for Private 
Prison Corporations, in IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST 3 (Sept. 2013), http://www.njjn.org/uploads 
/digital-library/Criminal-Lockup-Quota,-In-the-Public-Interest,-9.13.pdf.  
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state that contained 100 percent inmate quotas, meaning the state is 
contractually obligated to keep these prisons filled to 100 percent 
capacity, or pay the private company for empty beds.96 
A September 2013 report published by In the Public Interest (ITPI) 
on prison bed occupancy guarantee clauses in the criminal prison 
context analyzed private prison contracts between states and local 
jurisdictions. ITPI identified seventy-seven such private facilities 
nationwide and analyzed sixty-two contracts. Of those contracts, sixty-
five percent contained capacity quotas between 80 and 100 percent.97 
Amongst the negative effects of occupancy guarantee contractual 
clauses is that they “incentivize keeping prison beds filled, which runs 
counter to many states’ public policy goals of reducing the prison 
population and increasing efforts for inmate rehabilitation.”98 A related 
consequence of these clauses has been called the “low-crime tax,” 
meaning that since state or local governments have to pay corporations 
for unused beds, taxpayers are effectively penalized when their 
government achieves what should in theory be the goal of lower rates 
of incarceration.99 
Unsurprisingly perhaps, prison corporations have brought over 
occupancy guarantee clauses to their business dealings with ICE. 
Drawing upon data received from a Freedom of Information Act 
(FOIA) request, the advocacy groups Detention Watch Network and 
the Center for Constitutional Rights published a report on this practice 
in the operation of immigration detention facilities. The occupancy 
guarantees function similarly to those in the criminal context, with an 
additional feature called “tiered pricing,” in which ICE receives a 
discount on each person detained above the guaranteed minimum.”100 
The report states that the CCA was the first in 2003 to include an 
occupancy guarantee in their contract.101 In the intervening years, these 
clauses have increasingly been a part of contracts between ICE and 
private contractors both for detention operations and detention-
 
 96.  Id. 
 97.  Id. at 6.  
 98.  Id. at 3. Other negative implications discussed in the report are dangerous prison 
conditions, and the enactment of policies inconsistent with the public interest with respect to 
criminal justice. 
 99.  Donald Cohen, Lockup Quotas, Low-Crime Taxes, and the For-Profit Prison Industry, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 26, 2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/donald-cohen/lockup-
quotas-lowcrime-ta_b_3956336.html.  
 100.  DWN/CCR Report, supra note 23, at 6. 
 101.  Id. at 3. 
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related services.102 The report also found that “although guaranteed 
minimums are found formally only in contracts with private companies, 
subcontracting . . . means that private companies can be involved and 
minimums can occur in all three types of contract categories[,] 
including public facilities. . . .”103 Today, out of ICE’s Enforcement and 
Removal’s 24 field offices, half have occupancy guarantees.104 Beyond 
the increase in the frequency and breadth of these contractual terms, 
the occupancy minimums have gone up dramatically.105 
The Detention Watch Network and Center for Constitutional 
Rights’ FOIA request uncovered explicit evidence that ICE prioritizes 
keeping the detention facilities with occupancy guarantees full over 
those that do not have such contractual obligations. In an email from 
two ICE Enforcement and Removal Operations headquarter officials, 
local field offices were advised that “[t]he first priorities for funding are 
the 11 [field offices] that have detention facilities with guarantee 
minimum beds.”106 
The prevalence and influence of occupancy guarantees in ICE 
contracts with private prison companies recently gained the attention 
of some Congress members. In 2015, House Representatives Deutch 
(D-TX), Foster (D-IL), and Smith (D-WA) introduced “The Protecting 
Taxpayers and Communities from Local Detention Quotas Act.”107 The 
bill, which was not voted out of subcommittee,108 prohibits ICE from 
“negotiat[ing] with a private detention company a contract that 
 
 102.  Id. at 3 (stating that detention-related services can include contracting with companies 
to provide security, transportation, and food). 
 103.  Id. at 5.  
 104.  Id. at 4. The report goes on to provide evidence showing that “[b]ecause GEO Group 
has been the most successful company in getting guaranteed minimums incorporated into their 
contracts, their facilities are often prioritized in order to fill local quotas.” Id. at 6. 
 105.  See id. at 9 (“For example, the Houston Processing Center’s guaranteed minimum 
increased from 375 to 750 between 2003 and 2008, and at Port Isabel Detention Center, the 
guaranteed minimum increased from 500 to 800 between 2008 and 2014. Krome Detention 
Center’s guaranteed minimum also saw an increase from 250 to 450 between 2008 and 2014. For 
each, there is no publicly available information as to why such dramatic increases were 
necessary.”). 
 106.  Id. at 6. In another email, one of the same ICE Enforcement and Removal Operations 
headquarter officials, then Acting Assistant Director for Field Operations, Phillip T. Miller, 
emphasized to the field offices that they should “[e]nsure that all mandatory minimum detention 
bed guarantees are being met and that any net cost benefits of tiered pricing or low cost beds are 
being realized.” Id. The report notes that while ICE’s spreadsheet listed 11 field offices with 
occupancy guarantees, the FOIA response showed that the New Orleans Field Office also is 
subject to a contract with a guarantee minimum, for the Jena/LaSalle Detention Facility. Id. 
(footnotes omitted). 
 107.  H.R. 2808, 114th Cong. § 2 (2015). 
 108.  Id. 
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contains any provision relating to a guaranteed minimum number of 
immigration detention beds at any specific facility.”109 
During a press conference introducing the bill, Representative 
Deutch said this about occupancy guarantee clauses:  
As a businessman, I know that incentives can drive demand – 
incentives like [contractual occupancy guarantees] create an 
artificial demand for immigrant detention. While we continue 
efforts to eliminate the detention bed mandate, ending these 
prepaid detention contracts is one step towards making our 
immigration practices more humane and fiscally responsible.110 
Nonetheless, these contracts prevail in the immigration detention 
system: As of June 2016, occupancy guarantees in contracts between 
ICE and private prison corporations account for approximately 13,000 
beds per day, or about forty percent of the detention bed quota.111 
The affinity between the contractual occupancy guarantees and the 
bed quota in DHS’s appropriations legislation is evident from this 
exchange during a 2013 House Judiciary Committee hearing between 
Representative Henry Johnson and then-ICE director John Morton: 
Mr. Johnson. If [privately-run] beds are unfilled, is there is a 
requirement that the Federal Government pay the private 
contractor? 
Mr. Morton. Yes. . . .We do our very best not to have empty beds. 
Mr. Johnson. It is kind of like you want to fill the beds up so that 
you will not be paying for something that you are not using. Is that 
correct? 
Mr. Morton. This is correct. Obviously, if Congress appropriates us 
money, we need to make sure that we are spending it on what it was 
appropriated for. 
 
 
 109.  Id. 
 110.  Press Release, U.S. Reps. Ted Deutch, Bill Foster, and Adam Smith Introduce Bill 
Banning Local Immigrant Detention Quotas (June 18, 2015), http://teddeutch.house.gov/ne 
ws/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=398445.  
 111.  Schwartz & Shah, supra note 93. The contracts between CCA and ICE for the “family 
detention” facilities that were built to incarcerate the Central American women and children 
seeking refugee due to the growing gang violence in the region include an arrangement where 
“CCA is paid for 100 percent capacity even if the facility is, say, half full, as it has been in recent 
months.” See Chico Harlan, Inside the Administration’s $1 Billion Deal to Detain Central 
American Asylum Seekers, WASH. POST (Aug. 14, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
business/economy/inside-the-administrations-1-billion-deal-to-detain-central-american-asylum-
seekers/2016/08/14/e47f1960-5819-11e6-9aee-8075993d73a2_story.html. 
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Mr. Johnson. And so we got a guaranteed payment to private, 
nonprofit [sic] corporations like . . . Corrections Corporation of 
America . . . .112 
The justification for occupancy guarantees, contractual and in 
DHS’s appropriations legislation, appears to have less to do with needs 
related to sound immigration policy than about private prisons’ profits. 
2.  The Momentum to Curtail Private Prisons 
Because of practices like occupancy rate guarantees, the federal 
government in the criminal justice system has begun to cut back on its 
use of private prisons. On August 18, 2016, the Department of Justice 
(DOJ) announced that it would begin phasing out the contracting of 
federal prison facilities with private prison corporations.113 The DOJ 
has directed the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) to either decline renewing 
private contracts coming to an end, or to “substantially reduce its scope 
in a manner consistent with the law and the overall decline of the 
[B]ureau’s inmate population.”114 
Soon after the DOJ announcement, several members of Congress 
have pressed DHS to follow suit.115 Senator Bernie Sanders (I-Vt.) and 
Representative Raúl Grijalva (D-Ariz.) sent a letter to DHS Secretary 
Jeh Johnson calling for the agency to end its use of private detention 
facilities.116 The letter highlights that like their criminal counterparts, 
private detention centers, have significant problems, including higher 
reported incidents of abuse and violence and less access to medical care 
 
 112.  Torrey, supra note 16, at 7. 
 113.  Phasing Out Our Use of Private Prisons, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Aug. 18, 2016), 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/blog/phasing-out-our-use-private-prisons [hereinafter DOJ 
Announcement]. 
 114.  Id. 
 115.  Mike Lillis, Sanders, Liberals press Obama to expand closure of private prisons, THE 
HILL (Aug. 18, 2016), http://thehill.com/homenews/administration/291925-sanders-liberals-press-
obama-to-expand-closure-of-private-prisons. Senator Patrick Leahy (D-Vt.), senior senator on 
the Senate Judiciary Committee, stated that the DOJ’s mandate is not enough and called for these 
changes to be adopted by the DHS. Id.; see also Comment of Senator Patrick Leahy On the 
Announcement by the Department of Justice Regarding Private Prisons (Aug. 18, 2016), 
https://www.leahy.senate.gov/press/comment-of-senator-patrick-leahy-on-the-announcement-
by-the-department-of-justice-regarding-private-prisons.  
 116.  Letter to Secretary Jeh Johnson (Aug. 22, 2016), https://grijalva.house.gov/uploads 
/2016_8_22DHS_Private_prisons.pdf [hereinafter Letter to Johnson]; see also Chico Harlan, 
Sanders, Arizona’s Grijalva Call for Ending Use of Privately Run Detention Centers, WASH. POST 
(Aug. 22, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/sanders-arizonas-grijalva-
call-for-ending-use-of-privately-run-detention-centers/2016/08/22/f692f04a-6890-11e6-99bf-
f0cf3a6449a6_story.html. 
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than government-operated facilities.117  Secretary  Johnson announced 
that DHS will review the “current policy and practices concerning the 
use of private immigration detention and evaluate whether this practice 
should be eliminated.”118 
Secretary Johnson’s announcement was met with internal 
opposition. ICE and the Customs and Border Patrol have said that 
ending private detention facilities would lead to overcrowding and 
compromise the agency’s ability to ensure border security.119  
Immigrant rights advocates critiqued the fact that the Secretary 
announced a review in the first instance, stating that the agency already 
has the information it needs to know that contracting with private 
corporations is not good policy.120 Advocates and scholars also have 
questioned whether the alternatives, namely government-run facilities 
and ankle bracelet monitoring, are progress from the vantage of non-
citizens.121 It is unlikely that DHS would be able to meet the current 
immigration detention bed quota without contracting with private 
corporations, and so at the very least a decision to end corporate 
contracts to detain noncitizens could deliver the final blow to the 
provision. 
C.  The Problem with Quotas Generally 
The immigration detention bed quota is a stark example of the 
difference between what is beneficial to corporate profits and what is 
good public policy. The quota constitutes a “statistical approach” to law 
enforcement, emphasizing more—instead of better—enforcement.122 It 
also replaces systemic ways in which to promote public safety, such as 
community policing, with quantitative measures of citations, arrests, 
and convictions.123 And while the underlying motivation for imposing 
 
 117.  Letter to Johnson, supra note 116.  
 118.  Statement by Secretary Jeh C. Johnson on Establishing a Review of Privatized 
Immigration Detention (Aug. 29, 2016), https://www.dhs.gov/news/2016/08/29/statement-
secretary-jeh-c-johnson-establishing-review-privatized-immigration. 
 119.  Reuters, Closing Private Detention Centers for Migrants Could Raise More Problems, 
FORTUNE (Sept. 9. 2016), http://fortune.com/2016/09/09/closing-private-detention-centers-illegal-
immigrants/. 
 120.  Reynaldo Leanos, Jr., DHS Will Review its Relationship with Private Prison Companies, 
But There Are Many Questions About What Comes Next, PUB. RADIO INT’L (Sept. 1, 2016), 
http://www.pri.org/stories/2016-09-01/dhs-will-review-its-relationship-private-prison-companies-
there-are-many. 
 121.  Id. 
 122.  Charles E. Lupia, Statistical Justice, 69 DEC. N.Y. ST. B.J. 16 (1997).  
 123.  See id. (“[T]he results of this approach are at best temporary and unsatisfactory . . . [f]or 
they do not seek out the roots of crime.). 
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law enforcement quotas is to manage police officers who have 
considerable independence, “meeting a numerical goal does not 
necessarily have the intended effect on the targeted offense.”124 
There have been numerous advocacy efforts challenging quotas in 
the policing context, one high-profile example being the litigation 
against the New York Police Department’s (NYPD) stop-and-frisk 
practice.125 Moreover, arrest and ticket quotas are banned by law in 
many states, including New York, Illinois, California, and Florida.126 
Nonetheless, number-based policing remains if not explicitly, then an 
unsaid but understood performance standard. As one former NYPD 
officer put it, “[t]he culture is, you’re not working unless you are writing 
summonses or arresting people.”127 The Police Executive Research 
Forum (PERF) estimates that 18,000 police departments across the 
country likely impose quotas on their officers.128 
PERF’s executive director describes the problem with quotas this 
way: “there is an understandable desire to have productivity from your 
officers[,] . . . but telling them that you want to arrest x number of 
people, you have to cite x number of people, it just encourages bad 
performance on the part of officers.”129 A swath of bad performance 
resulting from enforcement quotas is the disproportionate impact of 
police contact and incarceration on poor communities of color.130 
 
 124.  Nathaniel Bronstein, Police Management and Quotas: Governance in the Compstat Era, 
48 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 543, 556 (2015). 
 125.  Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (noting that the stop-
and-frisk practices in New York City were banned, and when Bill de Blasio became mayor, he 
withdrew the city’s appeal of that decision). See generally Rima Vesely-Flad, New York City 
Under Siege: The Moral Politics of Policing Practices, 1993-2013, 49 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 889, 
900 (2014). 
 126.  Joel Rose, Despite Laws and Lawsuits, Quota-Based Policing Lingers, NAT’L PUB. 
RADIO (Apr. 6, 2015), http://www.npr.org/2015/04/04/395061810/despite-laws-and-lawsuits-
quota-based-policing-lingers. 
 127.  Id. (including a statement from a former officer who described the quota as “20 and 1,” 
referring to twenty citations and one arrest per officer, per month). 
 128.  Id. As a stark example of such bad performance, two former Atlanta police officers 
involved in a lawsuit over a public strip search claimed that “pulling down the pants of men in 
hopes of finding drugs was necessary to meet their quota of daily arrests.” Id. Another undesirable 
result of quotas is false arrests, and subsequent “dishonesty in the form of cover charges and 
added falsifications to increase the likelihood of conviction. . . .” David N. Dorfman, Proving the 
Lie: Litigating Police Credibility, 26 AM. J. CRIM. L. 455 (1999). 
 129.  Rose, supra note 126. 
 130.  Lupia, supra note 122 (“[H]istorical racism and continued resultant poverty have caused 
members of certain ethnic groups to have frequent brushes with the law. . . [and the result of] 
increased convictions. . . has been the statistic of large number of poorer persons in prison.”).   
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NYPD’s stop-and-frisk practice,131 tied to “productivity measures,”132 
disproportionately affected Black and Latino men.133 Police officers of 
color have claimed that quotas disproportionately impact them in 
relation to their White counterparts, because they “are unwilling to 
perform racially discriminatory and unwarranted enforcement actions 
against the minority community.”134 Racial profiling has also been 
identified as a problem in the immigration enforcement context. Much 
of the advocacy and scholarship about this issue focuses on 
enforcement against Latinos and, particularly after the 9/11 terrorist 
attacks, South Asian, Arab, and Muslim non-citizens.135 Another aspect 
of racial profiling in immigration enforcement that is equally 
concerning, but has received less attention, is its impact on black 
immigrants. A report by the Black Alliance for Just Immigration and 
the Immigrant Rights Clinic at New York University School of Law 
finds that more than one in five non-citizens facing removal on criminal 
grounds is black, even though black non-citizens comprise seven 
percent of the total non-citizen population.136 The study also revealed 
that black non-citizens are more likely to be detained and deported for 
 
 131.  Former NYC Mayor Rudolph Giuliani’s “broken windows” approach to law 
enforcement, which prioritized low-level crimes, and former NYC Mayor Michael Bloomberg’s 
“quality of life crimes” with the same focus, were the foundation of the NYPD’s stop-and-frisk 
practice. See Ari Rosmarin, The Phantom Defense: The Unavailability of the Entrapment Defense 
In New York City “Plain View” Marijuana Arrests, 21 J.L. & POL’Y 189 (2012). 
 132.  Vesely-Flad, supra note 125. 
 133.  Darius Charney et. al., Remark: Suspect Fits Description: Responses to Racial Profiling 
in New York City, 14 CUNY L. REV. 57 (2010). In 2009 alone, [the NYPD’s stop-and-frisk policy] 
resulted in over 575,000 stops of individuals. Of those who were stopped, 88% were totally 
innocent of any crime or offense. Fifty-four percent were black, 31% were Latino, and 9% were 
white.” Id. 
 134.  Selim Aigar & Josh Saul, NYPD Set Arrest Quotas for Minority Cops in Their Own 
Communities: Suit, N.Y. POST (Sept. 1, 2015), http://nypost.com/2015/09/01/cop-suing-over-
minority-arrest-quotas-says-he-faced-retaliation/.  
 135.  See, e.g., Aaron Haas, Profiling and Immigration, 18 WASH. & LEE J. CIVIL RTS. & SOC. 
JUST. 3, 12 (2011) (“The twin trends of criminalizing and localizing immigration enforcement have 
created a situation in which local police are encouraged to target Hispanics for detention and 
arrests. This kind of profiling has already been seen in the border areas, but, as the underlying 
trend goes national, it can be expected that profiling will also increasingly be seen throughout the 
country.”); Kevin R. Johnson, Racial Profiling After September 11: The Department of Justice’s 
2003 Guidelines, 25 IMMIGR. & NAT’LITY L. REV. 85, 86 (2004) (“The treatment of Arabs and 
Muslims after September 11 offers a lesson from current events how easily race, national origin, 
nationality, and religion can be abused by law enforcement.”); Sameer Ashar, Immigration 
Enforcement and Subordination: The Consequences of Racial Profiling After September 11, 12 
IMMIGR. & NAT’LITY L. REV. 545, 552 (describing a client who “was amongst the 1,200 Arab and 
South Asian Muslim men arrested and detained in the months following September 11”). 
 136.  The Black Alliance for Just Immigration and The New York University School of Law 
Immigrant Rights Clinic, The State of Black Immigrants (Sept. 2016), http://www.stateofblack 
immigrants.com/. 
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criminal convictions than other non-citizens group.137 With this context, 
mandating that tens of thousands non-citizens be detained each day 
seems particularly troublesome.138 
3.  U.S. Immigration Law’s History with Quotas 
The other contextual lens that renders the detention bed quota 
particularly objectionable is the historical use of quotas in U.S. 
immigration law. The turn of the twentieth century in the United States 
brought about a spike in immigration due to labor demands spurred by 
the Industrial Revolution, and Congress responded by enacting stricter 
immigration controls.139 One such measure was the temporary national 
origin quota enacted in 1910, which had the clear purpose of 
“confin[ing] immigration as much as possible to western and northern 
European stock.”140 
The 1910 quota was made permanent by enactment of the 1924 
National Origins Act, which set forth a formula of determining the 
annual allotment of visas contingent upon the number of American 
citizens who could trace their ancestry to particular nations.141 
Importantly, African Americans were excluded from the formula, 
meaning that they were not counted for the purpose of granted visas to 
Africans looking to immigrate to the United States.142 The 1952 
amendments to the quota system, moreover, included specific 
restrictions on “colonial immigration, which disproportionately 
affected persons of African descent.”143 
 
 137.  Id. 
 138.  Esther Yu Hsi Lee, The Mass Deportation of Black Immigrants That You Haven’t Heard 
About, THINKPROGRESS (July 26, 2016), https://thinkprogress.org/the-mass-deportation-of-
black-immigrants-that-you-havent-heard-about-4c291b0c5205#.fake96c80 (noting additionally 
that in Fiscal Year 2014, the ICE agency deported 1,203 African immigrants). For more generally 
on the plight of black immigrants in the U.S., see Andre Chung, Black & Undocumented: 
Caribbean Immigrant’s Long Fight for Citizenship, NBC NEWS (Apr. 23, 2016), 
http://www.nbcnews.com/news/nbcblk/black-undocumented-caribbean-immigrant-s-long-fight-
citizenship-n557441.  
 139.  Richard A. Boswell, Racism & U.S. Immigration Law: Prospects for Reform After 
“9/11?”, 7 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 315, 324 (2003). 
 140.  Id. at 324–25 (citing U.S. Comm’n on Civil Rights, The Tarnished Golden Door: Civil 
Rights Issues in Immigration 8 (1980)). 
 141.  Gabriel Chin, The Civil Rights Revolution Comes to Immigration Law: A New Look at 
the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965, 75 N.C. L. REV. 273, 279 (1996). 
 142.  Id. at 280 (citing Immigration Act of 1924, ch. 190 § 11(d), 43 Stat. 153, 159 (amended 
1952)) (establishing that “the term ‘inhabitants in continental United States in 1920’ does not 
include . . . the descendants of slave immigrants”).  
 143.  Id. For an in-depth discussion of African immigration to the U.S., see generally Bill Ong 
Hing, African Migration to the United States: Assigned to the Back of the Bus, in PERSPECTIVES 
ON THE IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY ACT OF 1965 60 (Gabriel J. Chin & Rose Cuison 
SINHA FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 3/6/2017  1:39 PM 
102 DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY [VOL. 12:2 
The end result of the quota system was that migration from some 
countries was highly favored over others, and the determination closely 
correlated with race.144 Particularly, natives from England, Germany, 
Ireland, and other Western European counties were favored and 
migrants from Africa, Asia, and Eastern Europe were not.145 Such a 
systematic exclusion has been described by Professors Gabriel Chin 
and Rose Cuison Villazor as “American apartheid.”146 President 
Lyndon Johnson’s speech upon the passage of the 1965 Immigration 
and Nationality Act heralded the end of “the harsh injustice of the 
national origins quota system,” a result that would permit migrants to 
“come [to the U.S.] because of what they are, and not because of the 
land from which they sprung.”147 
II. U.S. CONSTITUTIONAL & INTERNATIONAL LAW PROBLEMS WITH 
THE BED QUOTA 
The relationship between the government’s treatment of non-
citizens and American constitutional protections is a topic that has 
received considerable attention from the creation of federal 
immigration law. Additionally, the relationship between international 
law and U.S. immigration law, while complicated, is important from the 
vantage of protecting migrants and refugees. 
 
 
Villazor, eds., 2015).  
 144.  See Kevin R. Johnson, Race, the Immigration Laws, and Domestic Race Relations: A 
“Magic Mirror” Into the Heart of Darkness, 73 IND. L.J. 1111, 1115–16 (1998) (positing that the 
“use of quotas to exclude racialized peoples . . . evolved into more subtle forms of exclusion with 
the transformation of racial sensibilities in modern times.”). For a discussion on the link between 
eugenics and the immigration quota system, see Rachel Silber, Note, Eugenics, Family, and 
Immigration Law in the 1920s, 11 GEO. IMMIG. L.J. 859 (1997). 
 145. GABRIEL J. CHIN & ROSE CUISON VILLAZOR, PERSPECTIVES ON THE IMMIGRATION 
AND NATIONALITY ACT OF 1965 3 (Gabriel J. Chin & Rose Cuison Villazor, eds., 2015). See also 
Jan C. Ting, “Other than a Chinaman:” How U.S. Immigration Law Resulted From and Still 
Reflects a Policy of Excluding and Restricting Asian Immigration, 4 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. 
REV. 301 (1995). 
 146.  CHIN & VILLAZOR, supra note 145, at 2. For a comprehensive account of U.S. 
immigration controls from the 1920s to 1965, see MAE M. NGAI, IMPOSSIBLE SUBJECTS: ILLEGAL 
ALIENS AND THE MAKING OF MODERN AMERICA (2003). 
 147.  Brian Soucek, The Last Preference: Refugees and the 1965 Immigration Act, in CHIN & 
VILLAZOR, supra note 145, at 171. While the end of the national origins quota system lifted a 
significant barrier to migration to the United States, it detrimentally impacted Mexican migrants. 
See Jeanette Money & Kristina Victor, The 1965 Immigration Act: The Demographic and Political 
Transformation of Mexicans and Mexican Americans in U.S. Border Communities, in CHIN & 
VILLAZOR, supra note 145, at 315 (“By placing a cap on Western Hemisphere migration for the 
first time, it limited legal migration that had previously been virtually unlimited, at least in 
principle.”). 
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Constitutional immigration law is defined by Professor Hiroshi 
Motomura as “the application of constitutional norms and principles 
to test the validity of immigration rules.”148 There was scant guidance 
as to this application because, while the Declaration of Independence 
was considerably concerned about immigration,149 a decade later the 
nascent nation ratified the U.S. Constitution with only one reference to 
immigration.150 
Early constitutional immigration jurisprudence, as a result, was 
dominated by determining the allocation of immigration powers 
amongst the three branches of government.151 In doing so, the U.S. 
Supreme Court significantly limited judicial review over immigration 
matters by giving virtually absolute authority, known as the plenary 
power doctrine,152 to the legislative and executive branches.153 As 
 
 148.  A term coined by Professor Hiroshi Motomura, “‘constitutional immigration law’ means 
the application of constitutional norms and principles to test the validity of immigration rules in 
subconstitutional form, including statutes, regulations, and administrative guidelines.” Hiroshi 
Motomura, Immigration Law After a Century of Plenary Power: Phantom Constitutional Norms 
and Statutory Interpretation, 100 YALE L.J. 545, 548 (1990).  
 149.  The topic was explicitly addressed in the Declaration of Independence, as “one of the 
Founders’ grievances against King George was that he was limiting immigration, by trying ‘to 
prevent the population of these States; for that purpose obstructing the Laws for Naturalization 
of Foreigners; refusing to pass others to encourage their migrations hither[.]’” See Margaret Stock, 
Immigration and the Separation of Powers, WASH. TIMES (July 7, 2015), http://www.washington 
times.com/news/2015/jul/7/celebrate-liberty-month-immigration-and-the-separa/?page=all. 
 150.  See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 1 (“The Migration or Importation of such Persons as any 
of the States now existing shall think proper to admit, shall not be prohibited by the Congress 
prior to the Year one thousand eight hundred and eight. . . .”). Professors Legomsky and 
Rodriguez also explore arguments as to whether the government’s power to regulate immigration 
can be derived from the Commerce Clause, the Naturalization Clause, the War Clause, or through 
implied Constitutional powers (including as derived from Foreign Relations power). See 
STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY & CRISTINA M. RODRIGUEZ, IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE LAW AND 
POLICY 99–104 (6th ed. 2015). 
 151.  See Stock, supra note 149 (arguing that the rationale for establishing plenary power 
relates to the U.S. Constitution’s virtual silence on the subject of immigration); see also Adam B. 
Cox & Cristina M. Rodriguez, The President and Immigration Law, 119 YALE L.J. 458, 466 (2009) 
(“The text of the United States Constitution nowhere enumerates a power to regulate 
immigration.”).  
 152.  Stephen H. Legomsky, Immigration Law and the Principle of Plenary Congressional 
Power, 1984 SUPREME COURT REV. 255, 255 (1984) (introducing the term “plenary power 
doctrine” and critiquing the Supreme Court’s rationales for the doctrine). For insight into the 
domestic and global climate in which the plenary power doctrine was devised, see Johnson, supra 
note 144, at 1113 (discussing that the plenary power doctrine was created “in an era when 
Congress acted with a vengeance to exclude Chinese immigrants from [America’s] shores”); see 
also Peter J. Spiro, Explaining the End of Plenary Power, 16 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 339, 349 (2002) 
(“[T]he international context from which [plenary power] emerged . . . was historically 
characterized by the proto-anarchical nature of relations among states and the resulting need to 
centralize foreign policymaking in non-judicial institutions.”). 
 153.  Cox & Rodriguez, supra note 151, at 460 (positing that this articulation of plenary power 
is indicative of jurisprudence that largely treats “the political branches as something of a singular 
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articulated in The Chinese Exclusion Case, Chae Chang Ping v. United 
States: “The decision whether and how to exclude immigrants from the 
United States represented a political question, not subject to review by 
the judiciary.”154 Today, however, courts have shown less deference to 
the government’s power to detain immigrants by upholding challenges 
to indefinite and prolonged detention. 
In the international legal arena, the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, adopted in 1948 by the United Nations General 
Assembly after World War II, emphasizes protections against arbitrary 
detention generally. Developments in international and U.S. 
immigration law with regards to these protections for noncitizens have 
been divergent. On the one hand, legal instruments prohibiting 
arbitrary detention have extended the application of their provisions 
beyond refugees and asylum seekers, to migrants generally. On the 
other hand, changes toward criminalization in U.S. immigration law and 
policies over the past two decades, including the expansion of the 
immigration detention system, have created a significant schism 
between the legal landscape for migrants under domestic U.S. and 
international human rights law. 
This Part explores the immigration detention bed mandate through 
the lens of both the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the 
U.S. Constitution and the international human rights legal frameworks 
addressing arbitrary detention. 
A.  The Due Process Clause and Detention 
The plenary power doctrine historically has been an obstacle for 
non-citizens making constitutional claims concerning the manner by 
which the government seeks to remove them. This is due to the 
groundwork laid out by early constitutional immigration jurisprudence. 
Addressing the general applicability of the Fifth Amendment of the 
 
entity”). 
 154.  Id. at 467 (citing Chae Chan Ping v. United States (The Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 
U.S. 581, 609 (1989)). Professor Motomura defines the doctrine as establishing that “Congress 
and the Executive branch have broad and often exclusive authority in immigration matters” 
(without judicial oversight for constitutionality). Hiroshi Motomura, The Curious Evolution of 
Immigration Law: Procedural Surrogates for Substantive Constitutional Rights, 92 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1625, 1626 (1992). See also Abrams, supra note 9, at 601 (defining plenary power doctrine 
as giving “the political branches special deference when passing or executing immigration 
legislation, even where doing so would otherwise violate individual constitutional rights”); Adam 
B. Cox, Citizenship, Standing, and Immigration Law, 92 CALIF. L. REV. 373, 375 (2004) 
(discussing the plenary power doctrine generally from the viewpoint of citizens, rather than non-
citizens). 
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U.S. Constitution, the Supreme Court in Ekiu v. United States held that 
the due process clause does not override the plenary power doctrine, 
i.e., that concerns about due process do not require judicial oversight 
on matters of immigration.155 
Two years later came the first of two early foundational decisions 
on due process and detention. In Fong Yue Ting v. United States,156 the 
Court reaffirmed the Ekiu articulation of the plenary power doctrine 
and upheld the government’s power to detain a noncitizen pending 
removal. In doing so, the Court in Fong Yue Ting established that an 
“order of deportation is not punishment for a crime,”157 and that an 
individual incarcerated for allegedly violating immigration law “has not 
. . . been deprived of life, liberty[,] or property, without due process of 
law.”158 Professor Daniel Kanstroom describes the Fong Yue Ting ruling 
as “impl[ying] that the [federal government’s] deportation power is 
essentially limitless,”159 while noting that the Court modified this 
proposition of unbounded government power in a subsequent opinion 
a decade later.160 Even so, the plenary power doctrine remained a 
virtual shield for challenging the government’s detention practices. 
Three years after the Supreme Court’s decision in Fong Yue Ting, 
and “[o]n the very day it upheld racial segregation in Plessy v. 
Ferguson,”161 the Court handed down a ruling that limited the 
 
 155.  Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 660 (1892) (“[T]he decisions of executive 
or administrative officers, acting within powers expressly conferred by Congress, are due process 
of law.”). 
 156.  Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893). 
 157.  Id. at 730. 
 158.  Id. See also Daniel Kanstroom, Deportation, Social Control, and Punishment: Some 
Thoughts About Why Hard Laws Make Bad Cases, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1889, 1897 (2000) 
(describing Fong Yue Ting as “the first case to determine that the source of federal deportation 
power was the same as the source of the power to exclude.”). 
 159.  Kanstroom, supra note 158, at 1897. 
 160.  Professor Kanstroom cites Yamataya v. Fisher, 189 U.S. 86 (1903), for limiting the Fong 
Yue Ting ruling. Kanstroom, supra note 158, at 1897. Also known as The Japanese Immigrant 
Case, Yamataya opened the door for due process rights to apply to non-citizens by establishing 
that noncitizens who have already entered the U.S., even unlawfully, are entitled to more due 
process than those excluded at a port of entry. See Yamataya, 189 U.S. at 101 (stating that 
executive officials could not arbitrarily expel a person “without giving him all opportunity to be 
heard upon the questions Involving his right to be and remain in the United States”). In doing so, 
however, the Court found that the decisions of administrative or executive officers acting under 
their delegated powers constituted due process of law and were not subject to judicial review. Id. 
at 102. Finding that the noncitizen had been afforded an opportunity to be heard, the Yamataya 
opinion echoed the one the Court made in Ekiu, namely that the process given to a noncitizen is 
the process due. See id. 
 161.  Gabriel J. Chin, Regulating Race: Asian Exclusion and the Administrative State, 37 
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 43 (2002).  
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government’s detention power over Chinese immigrants.162 In Wong 
Wing v. United States,163 the Court struck down the provision of the 
Chinese Exclusion Act of 1892 “which enhanced the ban against most 
Chinese citizens and descendants from entering the United States by 
imposing a sentence of hard labor for violating the prohibition.”164 The 
Wong Wing decision also affirmed the right for the government to 
detain non-citizens in conjunction with removal proceedings.165 It is for 
this latter proposition, namely that detention imposed for 
administrative and not criminal purposes “is presumptively not 
punishment,”166 that Wong Wing has had the greatest influence over 
modern constitutional immigration jurisprudence on detention.167 This 
characterization of detention as administrative, not punitive, may be an 
implicit reason for the tolerance of the immigration detention bed 
quota. 
The bed quota mandated by Congress since 2009 intersects in 
several ways with the jurisprudence addressing detention and the Due 
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Having laid out the 
foundations of this jurisprudence above, the next sub-Part will explore 
current trends in the jurisprudence regarding immigration detention. In 
doing so, it will highlight how these developments implicate the 
constitutionality of the bed quota. 
1.  Current Trends in Immigration Detention Jurisprudence & 
Policy 
Over the past fifteen years, and especially in the past few years, 
courts have ruled in favor of detainees with respect to indefinite and 
prolonged mandatory detention. Professor David Cole characterizes 
immigration detention as preventive rather than punitive, involving 
depravation of “physical liberty without an adjudication of criminal 
 
 162.  See id. (“Chinese immigrants earned a rare win from the Supreme Court in Wong Wing 
v. United States.”). 
 163.  Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228 (1896). 
 164.  Sinha, supra note 36, at 9. 
 165.  Specifically, the Court asserted that “detention or temporary confinement, as part of the 
means necessary to give effect to the provisions for the exclusion or expulsion of aliens, would be 
valid.” Wong Wing, 163 U.S. at 235. The Court continued: “Proceedings to exclude or expel would 
be vain if those accused could not be held in custody pending the inquiry into their true character 
and while arrangements were being made for their deportation.” Id. 
 166.  Chin, supra note 161, at 44.  
 167.  This is why Professor Chin states that, “[w]hile Wong Wing held federal action through 
summary process unconstitutional, in an odd way it has operated to enhance rather than restrict 
government authority.” Id.  
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guilt.”168 Professor Cole draws from this depiction of detention to 
contend that its “use is strictly circumscribed by due process 
constraints,”169 a position bolstered by the waning influence of the 
plenary power doctrine over constitutional immigration jurisprudence, 
particularly in reference to detention.170 So while the plenary power 
doctrine historically limited judicial review of due process claims over 
federal removal decisions, as summarized below, the judicial treatment 
of the modern immigration detention legal scheme has been more 
varied. 
The modern statutory authority related to immigration detention is 
organized, generally speaking, in three broad categories. Two are in 
Section 236 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), which 
authorizes detention during removal. The first, Section 236(a), states 
that “an alien may be arrested and detained pending a decision on 
whether the alien is to be removed from the United States.”171 The 
statute provides for conditional release or a right to a bond hearing for 
non-citizens detained pursuant to this subsection.172 The second is 
Section 236(c), which is the mandatory detention provision for non-
citizens detained on criminal- or terrorism-related grounds.173 The last 
broad category of detention is authorized by Section 241(a) of the INA, 
which confers authorization to detain non-citizens with final orders of 
removal. 
 
 
 168.  See David Cole, In Aid of Removal: Due Process Limits on Immigration Detention, 51 
EMORY L.J. 1003, 1006 (2002) (“Immigration detention is by definition ‘preventive’ because the 
INS [now DHS] has no authority to detain for punitive purposes.”). 
 169.  Id. 
 170.  See, e.g., David S. Rubenstein, Immigration Structuralism, 8 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 81, 99 (2013) (“For generations now, the plenary [power] doctrine has been widely 
assaulted as an anachronism with little descriptive or normative appeal.”); Peter H. Schuck, 
Taking Immigration Federalism Seriously, 2007 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 57, 57 (2007) (“Despite the 
plenary power doctrine’s authority, it has been assailed over the years by many academics and 
defended, I think, by none.”); Brian G. Slocum, Canons, the Plenary Power Doctrine, and 
Immigration Law, 34 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 363, 369 (2007) (“The elimination of the plenary power 
doctrine would be a welcome development in immigration law.”); Stephen H. Legomsky, Ten 
More Years of Plenary Power: Immigration, Congress, and the Courts, 22 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 
925, 937 (1995) (stating the plenary power doctrine is a “constitutional oddity,” “has never been 
adequately explained” and it is time to “clean the slate”). 
 171.  Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 §236(a). 
 172.  INA §236(a)(2).  
 173.  See INA §236(c) (“The Attorney General shall take into custody any alien” who is 
inadmissible or deportable based on criminal or terrorism grounds, or deportable for a crime of 
moral turpitude “for which the alien has been sentence to a term of imprisonment of at least 1 
year.”). 
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The first case bearing significant influence over the modern 
American immigration detention system is Zadvydas v. Davis,174 which 
Professor Peter Spiro characterizes as “set[ting] the doctrinal stage . . . 
for the abandonment of plenary power.”175 The Supreme Court in 
Zadvydas addressed INA Section 241(a)(6), which gives DHS 
discretion to detain individuals with final orders of removal past the 
mandated ninety day period.176 The issue before the Court was whether 
the statute provided for indefinite detention for individuals who the 
government could not remove. As Professor Farrin Anello notes, “the 
Court relied upon basic due process principles that have become 
crucial to courts’ assessment of whether there is any limit to mandatory 
detention.”177 The Zadvydas ruling ultimately turned on a statutory, 
rather than constitutional, analysis. 178 There, Justice Breyer, writing for 
the majority, characterized section 241(a)(6) as ambiguous as to 
whether DHS could detain individuals indefinitely, and interpreting the 
statute as such would cause “a serious constitutional problem.”179 
The following term, in Demore v. Kim,180 the Supreme Court again 
considered the bearing of the Due Process Clause on immigration 
detention, analyzing INA section 236(c), the mandatory detention 
provision for individuals in removal proceedings.181 The Demore 
decision brought back the primacy of the plenary power doctrine, as 
the Court upheld the statute relying expressly on Wong Wing and “the 
political branches’ plenary power over deportation.”182 
 
 
 174.  Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001). 
 175.  Spiro, supra note 152, at 345.   
 176.  INA § 241(a)(2) provides for mandatory detention of individuals for ninety days after 
an order of removal becomes final. 
 177.  Farrin R. Anello, Due Process and Temporal Limits on Mandatory Immigration 
Detention, 65 HASTINGS L.J. 363, 371–72 (2014). Professor Anello continues: “The Court rested 
its decision [in Zadvydas] on the United States v. Salerno line of due process cases, making clear 
that immigration detention was subject to the same due process limits as other forms of civil 
detention.” Id. at 372. 
 178.  Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690. 
 179.  Id. at 372 (citing Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690); see also Spiro, supra note 152, at 345 
(“Zadvydas was by its terms not a definitive constitutional ruling; all the Court did, as a formal 
matter, was to interpret the relevant statute as not affording the Attorney General the power to 
undertake indefinite detentions. But that holding was grounded in the doctrine of serious 
constitutional doubt . . . . It would take no great step to convert Zadvydas’ exercise in statutory 
construction into a ruling on the constitutional merits.”). 
 180.  538 U.S. 510 (2003). 
 181.  Id. at 513. 
 182.  Anello, supra note 177, at 374. (“In the brief majority opinion, the Court dismissed the 
respondent’s due process claims with little constitutional analysis.”).  
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Recent developments, however, pose considerable challenges to the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Demore. One of these challenges throws 
into question a factor relied upon in the majority opinion, namely the 
average length of time an individual is detained. The Demore Court 
“did not expressly discuss the constitutional length of pre-removal 
mandatory detention.”183 But it did rely on what the government 
contended was the average length of time to hold that “Congress, 
justifiably concerned that deportable criminal aliens who are not 
detained continue to engage in crime and fail to appear for their 
removal hearings in large numbers that may require that persons such 
as respondent be detained for the brief period necessary for their 
removal proceedings.”184 The opinion stated that “the very limited time 
of detention” was too brief to trigger Fifth Amendment protections.185 
Recently, the Department of Justice (DOJ),186 compelled by 
Freedom of Information Act requests filed by immigrant rights’ 
organizations, admitted in a letter to the Supreme Court that they made 
“several significant errors”187 that led them to understate the length of 
time individuals were held under INA Section 236(c): 
Chief Justice William Rehnquist’s majority opinion relied on data 
from the government to conclude that resolving deportation 
appeals ‘takes an average of four months, with a median that is 
slightly shorter.’ . . . The new estimate put the average detention 
period at more than a year, or more than three times the four-month 
estimate the Supreme Court relied on with the Demore ruling.188 
The other set of developments from Demore involves significant 
subsequent litigation on the mandatory detention statute. In one of the 
cases, Jennings v. Rodriguez,189 which the Supreme Court is considering 
this term,190 the Ninth Circuit held that detainees incarcerated for six 
 
 183.  Bradley B. Banias, A “Substantial Argument” Against Prolonged, Pre-Removal 
Mandatory Detention, 11 RUTGERS RACE & L. REV. 31, 32 (2009). 
 184.  Kim, 538 U.S. at 513 (emphasis added). 
 185.  Id. at 530 n.12. 
 186.  At the time Demore was argued and decided, the immigration agency, Immigration and 
Naturalization Services (INS) was under the Department of Justice, as the Department of 
Homeland Security was just about to operationalize.  
 187.  Jess Bravin, Justice Department Gave Supreme Court Incorrect Data in Immigration 
Case, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 30, 2016), http://www.wsj.com/articles/justice-department-gave-
supreme-court-incorrect-data-in-immigration-case-1472569756.  
 188.  Id. 
 189.  Rodriguez v. Robbins, 804 F.3d 1060 (9th Cir. 2015), cert. granted sub nom., Jennings v. 
Rodriguez, 2016 WL 1182403 (U.S. June 20, 2016) (No. 15-1204). 
 190.  The DOJ letter to the Supreme Court concerning incorrect data submitted for the 
Demore case expressly stated that the data is relevant to the Jennings case. Bravin, supra note 
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months pursuant to mandatory detention are entitled to bond hearings. 
The Second and Third Circuits also have issued holdings providing for 
bond hearings after six months.191 Most recently, the Ninth Circuit again 
addressed the mandatory detention statute in Preap v. Johnson,192 
holding that the government can only hold non-citizens under INA 
Section 236(c) if it takes them into custody promptly upon their release 
from criminal custody.193 
There have also been significant developments related to non-
citizens’ Fifth Amendment rights in contexts other than indefinite and 
mandatory detention. Specifically, for vulnerable populations, there has 
been successful litigation for mentally disabled detainees’ right to a 
bond hearing.194 Immigrant rights’ advocates have detailed and lodged 
formal complaints about the ways in which detained non-citizens have 
limited or problematic access to lawyers and other ways to prepare 
their cases, including guards creating unreasonable delays for meetings 
between attorneys and detainees, and detainees lacking access to 
phones and video teleconferencing (VTC).195 In response to a 
complaint filed specifically about the Corrections Corporation of 
America’s Stewart Detention Center, the company installed a VTC 
system so that detainees, incarcerated 150 miles from Atlanta, Georgia, 
have access to adequate legal representation.196 
 
187. 
 191.  Lora v. Shanahan, 804 F.3d 601 (2d. Cir. 2015); Chavez-Alvarez v. Warden York County 
Prison, 783 F.3d 469 (3d. Cir. 2015).  
 192.  Preap v. Johnson, 831 F.3d 1193 (9th Cir. 2016). 
 193.  The Ninth Circuit interpreted the plain language of the statute, specifically the phrase 
“when . . . released,” to mean upon release from criminal custody and not after the noncitizen was 
released and resettled into the community. Id. at 1207. In the latter situation, the court held that 
the noncitizen had a right to a bond hearing. Id. 
 194.  See Franco-Gonzales v. Holder, No. 10-CV-02211-DMG (DTBx), 2011 WL 5966657, at 
*6 (C.D. Cal. 2011) (holding that the Plaintiff demonstrated a likelihood of irreparable harm and 
the balances of hardships tip in his favor, that granting the Plaintiff a motion for a custody hearing 
is in the public interest, and that the Plaintiff had exhausted administrative remedies). 
 195.  Rhonda Brownstein, The Corrections Corporation of America is Blocking Immigrants 
from Seeing their Lawyers at a Georgia Detention Center, HUFFINGTON POST (July 5, 2016), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/rhonda-brownstein/the-corrections-corporati_b_10819892.html. 
See also Abira Ashfaq, Invisible Removal, Endless Detention, Limited Relief: A Taste of 
Immigration Court Representation for Detained Noncitizens, in KEEPING OUT THE OTHER: A 
CRITICAL INTRODUCTION TO IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT TODAY 179–203 (David C. 
Brotherton & Philip Kretsedemas ed., 2008). 
 196. Immigrants Detained in Georgia to Get Better Access to Counsel After SPLC Complaint, 
SOUTHERN POVERTY LAW CENTER (Sept. 6, 2016), https://www.splcenter.org/news/2016/09/06 
/immigrants-detained-georgia-get-better-access-counsel-after-splc-complaint.  
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2.  Implications on the Bed Quota 
The bed quota mandated by Congress through DHS’s 
appropriations bill since 2009 warrants scrutiny, especially in light of 
recent jurisprudence placing limits on immigration detention. 
Specifically, the judicial trend towards upholding detainees’ rights with 
respect to prolonged mandatory detention can be applied to the fact 
that Congress requires the agency to maintain 34,000 detention beds a 
day. This is especially true in light of DHS’s stated policy of prioritizing 
the detention and removal of non-citizens who pose “threats to 
national security, public safety, and border security.”197 
Moreover, as the agency demonstrated during the potential 
government shut down in 2013,198 non-citizens who otherwise could be 
placed on supervised release are being detained. Congress expressly 
warned the Executive that these releases were a violation of the 
agency’s appropriations terms when ICE officials were summoned by 
the U.S. House of Representatives’ Homeland Security Committee in 
2013.199 If the mandate is to fill beds regardless of whether the non-
citizens should be subjected to detention, then the provision is squarely 
in violation of the procedural due process test set forth by Mathews v. 
Eldridge.200 Specifically, the individual interest is a liberty interest, there 
does not appear to be any outweighing government interest in filling 
34,000 beds a day, and there are no costly procedural safeguards at issue 
here.201 
In line with the recent case law concerning immigration detention, 
there is also a compelling statutory interpretation argument to clarify 
the meaning of the immigration detention bed quota. Currently, the 
bed quota seems to be incentivizing at best, and compelling at worst, 
the executive branch to detain more non-citizens than necessary and 
 
 197.  These internal enforcement priority memos commenced in 2011. John Morton, U.S. 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement Director, Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion Consistent 
with the Civil Immigration Enforcement Priorities of the Agency for the Apprehension, Detention, 
and Removal of Aliens (June 17, 2011), https://www.ice.gov/doclib/secure-communities/pdf 
/prosecutorial-discretion-memo.pdf. This policy was reinforced by DHS Secretary. Jeh Johnson, 
Secretary, U.S. Dept. of Homeland Security, Policies for the Apprehension, Detention and 
Removal of Undocumented Immigrants (Nov. 20, 2014), https://www.dhs 
.gov/sites/default/files/publications/14_1120_memo_prosecutorial_discretion.pdf. 
 198.  See supra notes 70 and accompanying text. 
 199.  See text accompanying supra note 71. 
 200.  Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). The Mathews’ balancing test weighs the 
burden of the deprivation of an individual’s interest against the burden on the government of 
affording increased due process, as well as the risk of erroneous deprivation and the probable 
value of additional procedural safeguards. Id. 
 201.  See id. 
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should be struck down under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment. Congress should be made to clarify that the DHS 
appropriations language of “shall maintain” does not mean the 
Executive must fill the beds. Whether this interpretation from a fiscal 
policy perspective makes sense is a question that will be explored in 
Part III. 
B.  International Law and Limits on the Use of Detention 
Individual countries’ immigration law and international human 
rights law overlap significantly. Some assert that while nation states 
have sovereign power to regulate migration across their borders, “their 
immigration enforcement policies and practices—including those 
relating to administrative detention—must comport with the 
requirements of international human rights law.”202 Professor Laura 
Adams points out that “[i]nternational human rights law and domestic 
immigration law . . .deal with many of the same fundamental issues, 
such as freedom from detention and the right to due process of law.”203 
While intertwined, Professor Adams lays out how the criminalization 
of U.S. immigration laws over the last decades, including the practices 
of mandatory and indefinite detention, has caused a “divergence” 
between the two bodies of law.204 
Nowhere is this divergence more evident perhaps than in the scale 
of the modern American immigration detention system. With the 
immigration detention bed quota at the helm of the mass incarceration 
of non-citizens in the U.S., this section examines the bed quota through 
the lens of international law and principles concerning the detention of 
migrants. Scholars have applied international human rights law to both 
particular aspects and the general use of the immigration detention 
system.205 This section hones in on how the existence and application of 
 
 202.  Eleanor Acer & Jake Goodman, Reaffirming Rights: Human Rights Protections of 
Migrants, Asylum Seekers, and Refugees in Immigration Detention, 24 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 507, 508 
(2010). 
 203.  Laura S. Adams, Divergence and the Dynamic Relationship Between Domestic 
Immigration Law and International Human Rights, 51 EMORY L.J. 983, 999 (2002).  
 204.  This divergence is particularly stark because, as Professor Adams points out, “[t]he 
criminalization of migration in the United States has occurred at the same time that the United 
States has accepted greatly enhanced international human rights obligations.” Id. at 985. 
 205.  See, e.g., Azadeh Shahshahani & Ayah Natasha El-Sergany, Challenging the Practice of 
Solitary Confinement in Immigration Detention in Georgia and Beyond, 16 CUNY L. REV. 243, 
262–68 (2013) (discussing international treaties ratified by the U.S., regional treatises, and special 
rapporteurs as challenging the practice of solitary confinement of immigrant detainees); Cathryn 
Costello, Human Rights and the Elusive Universal Subject: Immigration Detention Under 
International Human Rights and EU Law, 19 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 257, 261–63 (2012) 
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the bed quota specifically may violate such international norms. It does 
so by discussing the prohibition of arbitrary detention, as well as the 
standards set forth for the detention of vulnerable populations such as 
asylum seekers and minors. 
1.  Protections Related to Arbitrary Detention and Vulnerable 
Migrants 
International human rights law advances two general principles 
regarding the detention of migrants: detention should be a measure of 
last resort, and particularly vulnerable migrants should not be detained. 
Professor Denise Gilman has analyzed in great detail the application 
of human rights norms to both the fact and extent of migrant detention 
in the United States.206 She notes that while the first focus for 
international human rights bodies was the detention of refugees and 
asylum seekers,207 more recently such bodies have extended the 
applicability of international human rights laws to the detention of 
migrants generally.208 
The right to not be detained arbitrarily is a core right related to the 
right to personal liberty, the latter placed at the forefront in the creation 
of modern international human rights law with the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR).209 In tandem with the liberty 
 
(addressing the dissonance between universalism and statism in understanding and advance 
human rights); Gwynne Skinner, Bringing International Law to Bear on the Detention of Refugees 
in United States, 16 WILLIAMETTE J. INT’L. L. & DISP. RESOL. 270 (2008).  
 206.  Denise Gilman, Realizing Liberty: The Use of International Human Rights Law to 
Realign Immigration Detention in the United States, 36 FORDHAM INT’L. L.J. 243 (2013). 
 207.  See id. at 261–63 (“For more than forty years after the signing of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights in 1948 and the birth of modern human rights law, international 
bodies made little effort to analyze the application of human rights norms to immigration 
detention . . . . [But then beginning in the 1990s,] international human rights focused on the 
situation of refugees and asylum seekers in applying human rights norms to immigration 
detention. The UN High Commissioner for Refugees . . . first formulated specific guidelines to 
circumscribe the detention of refugees and asylum seekers in 1995 and then revised those 
guidelines shortly after in 1999.”). 
 208.  See id. at 263 n.81 (citing reports by the United Nations Commission on Human Rights’ 
Working Group on Arbitrary Detention and the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the 
Human Rights of Migrants). Other international human rights bodies have addressed the 
American immigration detention system, but not specifically or in great detail issues pertaining 
to the bed quota. See, e.g., INTER-AM. COMM’N ON HUMAN RIGHTS, ORG. OF AM. STATES, 
REPORT ON IMMIGRATION IN THE UNITED STATES: DETENTION AND DUE PROCESS 1, 8 (2010) 
(“[T]he DHS report describes the ‘unique challenges associated with the rapid expansion of ICE’s 
detention capacity from fewer than 7,500 beds in 1995 to over 30,000 today, as the result of 
congressional and other mandates.’”).  
 209.  Article 3 of the UDHR provides: “Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of 
person.” Laurent Marcoux, Jr., Protection from Arbitrary Arrest and Detention Under 
International Law, 5 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 345, 345 (1982) (citing G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, 
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interest enshrined in the UDHR is Article 9’s specific prohibition of 
“arbitrary arrest, detention or exile.”210 
Decades later, the United Nations adopted the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).211 Article 9(1) of the 
ICCPR establishes: “Everyone has the right to liberty and security of 
person. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention. No 
one shall be deprived of his liberty except on such grounds and in 
accordance with such procedure as are established by law.”212 
Elaborating on this ICCPR provision, the United Nations Human 
Rights Committee has established that “[d]etention in the course of 
proceedings for the control of immigration is not per se arbitrary, but 
the detention must be justified as reasonable, necessary and 
proportionate in the light of the circumstances and reassessed as it 
extends in time.”213 
Detention as a measure of last resort for migration regulation is 
another related overarching principle established by human rights law. 
Also referred to by Professor Gilman as “a presumption against 
detention for all migrants,”214 the principle of detention as a last resort 
is articulated by international bodies such as the United Nations 
Working Group on Arbitrary Detention and the UN Special 
Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Migrants. This principle is 
particularly prevalent in the human rights law instruments related to 
the protection of vulnerable migrants.215 Under U.S. law, asylum seekers 
are amongst the categories of migrants and refugees subject to 
mandatory detention. In 2014, ICE detained 44,270 asylum seekers, 
representing a three-fold increase from 2010.216 
 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Dec. 10, 1948)). Article 31(2) of The Convention 
Relating to the Status of Refugees, which went into effect in 1954, prohibits “restrictions on 
refugees’ movements” outside of circumstances when those restrictions are “necessary.” Skinner, 
supra note 205, at 280. 
 210.  G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Dec. 10, 1948). 
 211.  G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI) A, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Mar. 23, 
1976).  
 212.  U.N. Human Rights Comm., General Comment No. 35, at 7 (Dec. 16, 2014), 
http://www.legal-tools.org/uploads/tx_ltpdb/G1424451.pdf. 
 213.  Id. at ¶ 18.  
 214.  Gilman, supra note 206, at 269. 
 215.  An Inter-American Commission on Human Rights Report specifically stated concern 
for the fact that “vulnerable groups figure prominently among those being held in immigration 
detention.” INTER-AM. COMM’N ON HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 208, at 35. 
 216.  Lifeline on Lockdown: Increased U.S. Detention of Asylum Seekers, HUMAN RIGHTS 
FIRST 11, http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/sites/default/files/Lifeline-on-Lockdown_0.pdf. To 
contrast, in 2010, ICE detained 15, 769 asylum seekers. Id. 
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The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) 
Detention Guidelines, for example, begins Guideline 4 by stating: 
“Detention must not be arbitrary.”217 The UNCHR Guidelines defines 
arbitrary broadly, to mean “not only unlawfulness, but also elements of 
inappropriateness, injustice and lack of predictability.”218 It goes on to 
establish that “[d]etention can only be resorted to when it is 
determined to be necessary, reasonable in all the circumstances and 
proportionate to a legitimate purpose.”219 There also are international 
human rights legal norms in the form of Conventions that the United 
States did not ratify.220 
III. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS 
The immigration detention bed quota is a significant yet little-
known impetus for the trend of mass incarceration in the immigration 
context. As Representative Adam Smith noted, “[W]e simply detain too 
many people, and the federal mandate [bed quota] certainly drives a 
lot of that.”221 In the criminal context, the United States government 
and society more broadly are meaningfully engaging the question of 
how to curtail  mass incarceration.222 The same scrutiny has not been 
 
 217.  U.N. High Commissioner on Refugees, Detention Guidelines: Guidelines on the 
Applicable Criteria and Standards Relating to the Detention of Asylum-Seekers and Alternatives to 
Detention, at 6, 15 (2012) [hereinafter UNHCR Guidelines] (“The rights to liberty and security of 
person are fundamental human rights, reflected in the international prohibition on arbitrary 
detention, and supported by the right to freedom of movement.”). 
 218.  Id. at 15. The United Nations Committee Study of the Right of Everyone to be Free 
from Arbitrary Arrest, Detention and Exile conducted an extensive study of the meaning of 
“arbitrary,” and concluded that it encompasses more than illegal and came up with the following 
definition: “Arrest or detention is arbitrary if it is (a) on the grounds or in accordance with 
procedures other than those established by law or (b) under the provisions of a law, the purpose 
of which is incompatible with the right to liberty and security of person.” Marcoux, supra note 
209, at 366.  
 219.  UNHCR Guidelines, supra note 217, at 21. The UNHCR Guidelines are in part 
interpretations of earlier proclamations as to the rights of refugees, such as the Convention 
Relating to the Status of Refugees, promulgated in 1954, the latter which prohibits restrictions on 
refugees’ movements, unless such restrictions are “necessary.” Convention Relating to the Status 
of Refugees, art. 31(2), Apr. 22, 1954, 189 U.N.T.S. 150. 
 220.  See, e.g., G.A. Res. 44/25, Convention on the Rights of the Child, art. 37(b) (Sept. 2, 
1990) (prohibiting arbitrary deprivation of liberty, and stating that the detention “of a child . . . 
shall be used only as a measure of last resort.”). 
 221.  Planas, supra note 92. 
 222.  See, e.g., Stephanos Bibas, The Truth About Mass Incarceration, NAT’L REV. (Sept. 16, 
2015), http://www.nationalreview.com/article/424059/mass-incarceration-prison-reform (arguing 
that “just because liberals are wrong does not mean the status quo is right” to take the position 
that while mass incarceration is not about race, it is still not good policy.). See also MICHELLE 
ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS 
(2010); Dorothy E. Roberts, The Social and Moral Cost of Mass Incarceration in African 
American Communities, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1271 (2004). 
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applied to the mass detention of non-citizens.223 This Part offers public 
policy reasons to include immigration detention, and the bed quota 
specifically, into the critical examination of the American mass 
incarceration trend. 
A line of argument against an arbitrarily high quota to detain 
immigrants relies on the practical. A past DHS official has questioned 
the quota along these lines: 
Former ICE director Julie Myers Wood, who led the agency from 
2006 to 2008 under President George W. Bush, said a congressional 
mandate for ICE to maintain a minimum number of detainees was 
a reasonable guideline at the outset of her tenure, when the Border 
Patrol was making more than a million arrests per year. But today, 
she said, ‘it doesn’t make sense.’224 
Wood’s statement highlights how the number of detention beds 
that make up the bed quota does not correlate to needs assessment. 
Another practical reason is fiscal, including more cost effective 
ways to ensure that non-citizens in removal proceedings do not 
abscond.  There are also normative arguments against the bed quota, a 
significant one being the importance of prosecutorial discretion in 
enforcing immigration law. And while shifting institutional behavior is 
a significant undertaking, there is compelling cause to do exactly that 
for immigration detention policy-making. This Part will explore these 
three arguments. 
A.  Prosecutorial Discretion 
Prosecutorial discretion has been an important element of 
immigration enforcement, and DHS during the Obama Administration 
 
 223.  See Anita Sinha, Ending Mass Incarceration, But Not for Immigrants: A Tale of Two 
Policies, HUFFINGTON POST (July 27, 2015), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/anita-sinha/ending-
mass-incarceration-but-not-for-immigrants_b_7874750.html (“Conspicuously absent from this 
conversation, however, is the fact that immigration detention is now the ‘largest mass 
incarceration movement in U.S. history’”). The one exception is the current review called by the 
DHS Secretary on the use of private prison corporations in the operation of the detention 
facilities, following the DOJ announcement that the government will stop using private 
companies for prisons and jails. See supra text accompanying notes 93–112. 
 224.  Nick Miroff, Controversial Quota Drives Immigration Detention Boom, WASH. POST 
(Oct. 13, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/controversial-quota-drives-immigration-
detention-boom/2013/10/13/09bb689e-214c-11e3-ad1a-1a919f2ed890_story.html. According to 
the Pew Research Center, there has been a decrease in unauthorized immigration into the United 
States since the “Great Recession” of 2007-2009. See JEFFREY S. PASSEL & D’VERA COHN, PEW 
RESEARCH CTR., UNAUTHORIZED IMMIGRANT POPULATION STABLE FOR HALF A DECADE 
(2015), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2015/07/22/unauthorized-immigrant-population-
stable-for-half-a-decade/.  
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has emphasized its importance. Professor Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, in 
her book Beyond Deportation, states: “A favorable exercise of 
prosecutorial discretion in immigration law identifies the agency’s 
authority to refrain from asserting the full scope of the agency’s 
enforcement authority in a particular case.”225 This articulation of 
discretion in immigration enforcement presents how the Congressional 
bed quota may be in tension with the Executive’s authority to detain 
and removal noncitizens. 
Prosecutorial discretion “has its historical underpinnings in the 
executive branch’s authority, both implicit and explicit, to determine 
which individuals, who otherwise have no valid immigration status, may 
remain in the United States.”226 It was a tool emphasized by the 
General Counsel in 1976 of then-Immigration and Naturalization 
Services (INS).227 From this time to the present, the discretion whether 
to arrest, detain, and remove a non-citizen from the United States was 
presented as being grounded in both economic and humanitarian 
concerns.228 
With a significantly overburdened immigration enforcement and 
court system today, prosecutorial discretion has taken on renewed 
importance. Former ICE director John Morton issued guidance in 2011 
on the exercise of prosecutorial discretion as a way to encourage field 
offices to use it in individual matters, and described its importance this 
way: 
ICE must prioritize the use of its enforcement personnel, detention 
space, and removal assets to ensure that the aliens it removes 
represent, as much as reasonably possible, the agency’s enforcement 
priorities, namely the promotion of national security, border 
security, public safety, and the integrity of the immigration system.229 
 
 225.  WADHIA, supra note 19, at 7. 
 226.  Erin Corcoran, Seek Justice, Not Just Deportation: How to Improve Prosecutorial 
Discretion in Immigration Law, 48 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 119, 134–35 (2014). 
 227.  Madison Burga & Angelina Lerma, The Use of Prosecutorial Discretion in the 
Immigration Context After the 2013 ICE Directive: Families are Still Being Torn Apart, 42 W. ST. 
L. REV. 25, 29 (2014); see also Maria A. Fufidio, Note, “You May Say I’m a Dreamer, but I’m not 
the Only One”: Categorical Prosecutorial Discretion and its Consequences for US Immigration 
Law, 36 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 976, 986 (2013) (“[I]mmigration officials have been granting 
discretionary relief from deportation to immigrants prior to the formal recognition of this practice 
in the mid-1970s.”). 
 228.  See Burga & Lerma, supra note 227, at 30 (discussing the two principles of economic 
constraints and humanitarian concerns in using prosecutorial discretion). 
 229.  JOHN MORTON, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS 
ENF’T, EXERCISING PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION CONSISTENT WITH THE CIVIL IMMIGRATION 
ENFORCEMENT PRIORITIES OF THE AGENCY FOR THE APPREHENSION, DETENTION, AND 
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Professor Wadhia echoes this economic justification in the form of 
limited government resources as one of the theories animating 
prosecutorial discretion.230 Harkening back to the articulation made 
over 40 years ago, Wadhia also presents the humanitarian purpose of 
prosecutorial discretion, namely not apprehending, detaining, or 
removing individuals who violated immigration law but otherwise have 
redeeming equities or who may be victims of crimes or disasters.231 
As highlighted by the DACA and DAPA programs, the Executive 
has exercised prosecutorial discretion for groups, in addition to using it 
to make individual determinations. As discussed in the Introduction,232 
with the United States v. Texas judicial impasse the role of prosecutorial 
discretion for the former use is still an open question. However, these 
legal challenges do not implicate the long-standing principle that the 
Executive has discretion over whether to detain and pursue removal 
on a case-by-case basis. It is in this latter realm on which the 
Congressional bed quota appears to be encroaching. 
B.  Alternatives to Detention 
Institutional confinement of non-citizens in removal proceedings is 
not the only way to ensure that they do not abscond. There are 
community-based Alternatives to Detention (“ATD”), which include 
electronic monitoring such as wearing ankle bracelets, check-ins with 
DHS, and curfews.233 In 2004, ICE created the Intensive Supervision 
Appearance Program (ISAP) as for low priority non-citizens in 
removal proceedings, and have initiated other programs over the 
years.234 ATD has been recommended for vulnerable populations, such 
as LGBT detainees.235 The financial cost of the U.S. federal government 
detaining non-citizens during their removal proceedings as opposed to 
 
REMOVAL OF ALIENS (2011), https://www.ice.gov/doclib/secure-communities/pdf/prosecutorial-
discretion-memo.pdf.  
 230.  WADHIA, supra note 19, at 8. 
 231.  Id. 
 232.  See supra notes 11–13 and accompanying text. 
 233.  Torrey, supra note 16, at 6. 
 234.  Maria Mendoza, A System in Need of Repair: The Inhumane Treatment of Detainees In 
the U.S. Immigration Detention System, 41 N.C. J. INT’L LAW 405, 445 (2016) (“In 2007, ICE 
introduced the Enhanced Supervision/Reporting Program (‘ESR’), which uses several of the 
same procedures as ISAP, in addition to supervisory tools such as residence verification. At 
present, ‘ISAP and ESR . . . can supervise 6,000 and 7,000 individuals, respectively.’”). 
 235.  See Shana Tabak & Rachel Levitan, LGBTI Migrants in Immigration Detention: A 
Global Perspective, 37 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 1, 44 (2014) (“Ultimately, states should heed the 
recommendations by UNHCR . . . by providing alternatives to detention for all self-identifying 
sexual minorities.”). 
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using an ATD is significant: Immigration detention costs taxpayers 
about $160 per person, per day; ATD costs anywhere from 17 cents to 
about $18 per person, per day.236 
The conservative research institute Center for Immigration Studies 
has described the purpose of Congress’ immigration bed quota as 
“ensur[ing] that ICE is doing its job of facilitating suspected removable 
aliens’ appearance in immigration court, and if applicable, compliance 
with removal orders.”237 ATD, however, have been proven to be as 
effective as detention in achieving these objectives. Non-citizens who 
participated in one ATD study demonstrated a 91 percent success rate 
for appearing at all their court hearings, with asylum seekers at a 
slightly higher rate of 93 percent.238 According to Human Rights First, 
in Fiscal Year 2014 participants of ISAP had a 99 percent appearance 
rate for their final removal hearing.239 
The Obama Administration, for Fiscal Year 2016, requested from 
Congress increased funding for its ATD programs.240 In response, the 
Chair of the House Commerce-Justice-Science Subcommittee, John 
Culberson, raised the immigration detention bed quota, stating that an 
“increased use of alternative methods does not mean Congress should 
step back from its bed quota.”241 This statement is at odds with an 
underlying purpose of ATD programs, which is to spend less money on 
brick and mortar detention. Representative Culberson’s statement is in 
line with the argument that the bed quota is a “message to ICE that its 
policy should favor detaining a large number of aliens regardless of 
whether that detention makes sense from an economic or security 
 
 236. LUTHERAN IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE SERV., ALTERNATIVES TO DETENTION: 
HISTORY AND BACKGROUND (2013), http://lirs.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/LIRS-Backgr 
ounder-on-Alternatives-to-Detention-12-6-13.pdf. 
 237.  Eric Brickenstein, Making Bail and Melting Ice, 19 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 229, 230 
(2015) (citing Jessica Vaughan, Enforcement Metrics Support Case for Detention Bed Mandate, 
CENTER FOR IMMIGR. STUD. (Nov. 24, 2013), http://cis.org/vaughan/enforcement-metrics-
support-case-detention-bed-mandate)).  
 238.  U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, STATUTORY ENFORCEMENT REPORT: WITH LIBERTY 
AND JUSTICE FOR ALL: THE STATE OF CIVIL RIGHTS AT IMMIGRATION DETENTION FACILITIES, 
at 65 (Sept. 2015), http://usccr.gov/pubs/Statutory_Enforcement_Report2015.pdf. See also Mark 
Noferi, Making Civil Immigration Detention “Civil,” and Examining the Emerging U.S. Civil 
Detention Paradigm, 27 J. C.R. & ECON. DEV. 533, 569 (2014) (“Immigration detention has the 
dual goal of preventing flight before deportation, which can be adequately addressed through less 
restrictive measures than incarceration.”). 
 239.  HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, IMMIGRATION DETENTION: HOW CAN THE GOVERNMENT 
CUT COSTS?, (2013), http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/uploads/pdfs/immigration-detention-fact-
sheet-jan-2013.pdf.  
 240.  Chacko, supra note 30. 
 241.  Id. 
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perspective.”242 This implication, however, does not comport with what 
is in the best interest of society. 
C.  Shifting Institutional Behavior 
As with the scaling back of mass incarceration in the criminal 
justice context, ensuring that the detention of non-citizens in the 
United States is in line with sound public policy will require 
considerable changes, including contending with the role of profit-
driven stakeholders. Congress’ inclusion of a daily quota of 34,000 beds 
in DHS’s appropriations has fueled institutional dependency on 
locking up non-citizens regardless of whether it is good public policy. 
Professor César Cuauhtémoc García Hernández describes the 
immigration detention bed quota as indicative of a “path-dependent 
approach to imprisonment.”243 This approach encompasses 
institutional behavior where future decisions are effected by previous 
policy decisions, and so path-dependent choices are particularly 
difficult to reverse. In the criminal justice context, Professor Michelle 
Alexander emphasizes the role of private-sector investment and prison 
profiteers in mass incarceration.244 In the case of the detention bed 
quota, “shifting away from imprisonment would require that DHS 
empty thousands of prison beds that Congress currently requires it to 
pay for and that it has made a habit of filling.”245 
A shift after the November 2016 election results is not promising. 
One indicator is the surge in the stock prices of the two largest prison 
corporations, CCA and GEO Group.246 Security analysts attribute the 
spike in share prices to the likelihood of policies that would “further 
necessitate a sizable contract detention population.”247 This anticipated 
new political climate may, however, alter the need for imposing a quota 
on DHS, which could in the future help shift policies away from the 
mass detention of non-citizens. 
 
 
 242.  Brickenstein, supra note 237, at 240. 
 243.  Hernández, supra note 70, at 1504. 
 244.  See ALEXANDER, supra note 222, at 218–20.  
 245.  Hernández, supra note 70, at 1505. 
 246.  Tracy Alloway & Lily Katz, Private Prison Stocks Are Surging After Trump’s Win, 
BLOOMBERG (Nov. 9, 2016), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-11-09/private-
prison-stocks-are-surging-after-trump-s-win.  
 247.  Id.  
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CONCLUSION 
The immigration detention bed quota imposed by Congress since 
2009 has been a largely invisible force behind a swollen system. As a 
law enforcement quota through the Legislative branch on an executive 
agency tasked with the enforcement at issue, it is unprecedented and 
unmatched. The bed quota is becoming even more of an outlier with 
trends in constitutional immigration law concerning the application of 
due process limitations on detention, and developments moving away 
from private prison corporations’ influence in the U.S. criminal justice 
system. International human rights law and public policy 
considerations contribute to a case for re-thinking the immigration 
detention bed quota. 
